### 1NC

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#### Restriction is a prohibition

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation. ¶ Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as; ¶ A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb. ¶ In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment. ¶ Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

Restrictions on authority are distinct from conditions

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

Voter

Limits

a.) Limits and ground - they make the topic bidirectional and open the floodgates to tons of new affs.

b.) Precision - Our evidence clearly defines restrictions in the context of authority = Precision is key to generate topic education and research.

### Off

#### The 1AC brackets the full complexity of crisis and the value questions behind their scenarios—Preventing the ADAPTATION and RESILIENCE necessary for a viable future.

Mangalagiu 2011 (Diana Mangalagiu, Prof of Strategy at Smith School of Enterprise and Environment-University of Oxford “Risk and resilience in times of globalization” An emerging research program for Global Systems Science: Assessing the state of the art, 10/4/11, http://www.gsdp.eu/)

The recent financial crisis highlights the challenges of, and the potential of catastrophic impacts from the failure to address global, systemic and long term risks. The crisis was neither prevented, nor effectively anticipated, by the hosts of experts in risks and futures employed by the industry. Despite the sophisticated strategic planning and risk management approaches adopted by individual banks and regulators, the lack of reflexivity in anticipatory knowledge processes, coupled with overconfidence in calculable and manageable risks, contributed to the denial, dismissal and ignorance of new forms of vulnerability and, in particular, systemic risk (Wilkinson and Ramirez, 2010; Selsky et al, 2008). It also highlights that risk management approaches that focus on stress testing the parts (e.g. individual banks, companies, governments, cities etc.) of a system are no longer enough. The notion of systemic risk and practices of systemic risk management are being influenced by multiple traditions in scholarship (e.g. complexity science, resilience concepts), contesting theories of risk (e.g. social, mathematical, psychological) and the practical experiences harvested through professional bodies focused on risk management in banking and financial services, environmental management, urban planning, insurance and reinsurance, etc. In this WP, we focus on identifying and comparing how risk management, the search for resilience and their respective approaches to strategic foresight and anticipatory knowledge might be better related and more effectively practiced in a range of different contexts such as at the organizational, sectoral-, national- and international-systems levels. Our aim is to: - Unpack what systemic risk means and how it is shaped by different disciplines and different traditions of risk management; also unpack what resilience means; - Reveal and clarify how systemic risk and resilience are being operationalized in a range of settings and situations; - Formulate research questions and develop knowledge, methodologies and guidance in order to reveal, inform and create so-called best and next practices in systemic risk management and governance and search for resilience. Our first year deliverable is the state of the art concerning risk, systemic risk and resilience in times of globalization. ¶ **2. Preliminary state of the art on risk and systemic risk** ¶ 2.a. General conceptions of risk 4 The conventional risk management paradigm assumes that a loss event is relatively limited, specific and isolated and with proper analysis can be anticipated and thus, avoided or contained and mitigated. In the conventional risk management paradigm the default is to forecast the future - or a probabilistic analysis – i.e. the assumption that the future is knowable. Formal interest in risk and risk management originates from the fields of engineering and epidemiology in the 20th century (Kates & Kasperson, 1983) and from interdisciplinary studies of natural hazards (White & Haas, 1975). Since then the social sciences created significant independent contributions to risk research (Golding, 1992). Krimsky (1992) summarized the roles theory can take in risk analysis, which are quantitative laws, taxonomic frameworks, models, functionalist explanations, cognitive explanations, or analogical models and interpretive representations. Beck (1992, 1994) and Giddens (1991, 1999) pointed to the elaborate role risk plays in the macro organizational levels of modern society. Societies are self-reflective in the sense that they seek to govern their own behavior to avoid catastrophic consequences. As such, the concept of risk is also politically relevant (Lupton, 1999). Providing an overview of the different perspectives on risk research, Renn (1992) distinguishes the technical perspective on risk (expected or modeled value, probabilistic risk assessment), economic perspectives (risk-benefit analysis), psychological perspectives (psychometric and cognitive analyses), sociological perspectives (plurality of approaches), and cultural perspectives (grid-group analysis). While economic and technical risk assessments are similar with regard to their reductionist and one-dimensional view of the world, narrowing down risk analysis to a form of quantifiable expected value, psychometric, sociological, and cultural views take a multi-dimensional view that is concerned with 5 the myriad forms of risk perception. In Renn’s (1992) systemic classification of risk perspectives the main applications of the latter group are therefore seen in policy making, regulations, mediation, and risk communication, whereas the former be applicable for decision making (insurance, health, environmental protection, and safety engineering). The different research strands can further be summarized regarding their theoretical focus on either the actual assessment of risk, the perception of risk, or blended approaches. Technical, economic, and quantitative social benefit approaches to measure risk can be counted towards those perspectives concerned with practical risk assessment (see e.g. Just, Heuth, & Schmitz, 1982; Lowrance, 1976; Starr, 1969), also apparent in the broad use of the value at risk concept in finance, which basically attempts to calculate an expected value of losses (see e.g. Jorion, 2007). The psychological perspectives look into the perception of risk at an individual level (see e.g. Boholm, 1998; Slovic, 1987; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) while the cultural theories of risk are concerned with the perception of risk at a collective level, as they see risk as the result of what different groups within a society – shaped by their social norms, values, and ontological assumptions – perceive as potential hazards (see Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Rayner, 1992; Thompson et al, 1990). In a way, cultural theories of risk attempt a form of risk assessment in a qualitative and social constructivist manner, while psychological theory examines the different perceptions of objective risks. Cultural theory has been criticized for seeing individuals only in aggregate, as being too simplistic, rather descriptive, and as being difficult to measure empirically (Renn, 1992). Marris et al. (1998) find some support for both the psychological and the cultural theory paradigms, although the cultural theory explains only very little variance in risk perception. As the only common denominator of sociological theories of risk is their awareness that human actors can only perceive the world through subjective social and cultural influences (Renn, 1992), they may best be seen as blended approaches leaning towards either weak or strong constructivist positions. Sociological perspectives further take into account what consequences arise from risk for the society (see e.g. Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1999) and bring fairness and competences into the picture, which can provide a basis for normative conclusions regarding risk policies (Renn, 1992). The different theoretical conceptions of risk are non‐exclusive and can nurture each other. One attempt to integrate different perspectives consists in the Amplification of Risk framework, which builds on the analogy of signaling theory and sees risks to emerge from signals of initial real risks amplified in several steps of social interaction processes influenced by cultural setting (see Kasperson, et al., 1988; Kasperson, 1992; Kasperson, et al, 2003; Renn, et al, 1992). 2.b Systemic risk in the futures literature In the futures literature2, the term ‘systemic risk’ is not featured frequently and has only been used recently (Checkley 2009). Other terms akin to systemic risk are in more frequent use. They comprise complex hazards (de Souza Porto & De Freitas 2003), extreme risks (Nakau 2004), emerging risks from science and technology (Wiedemann et al. 2005), catastrophic risk (Geiger 2005), natural disaster-triggered technological (natech) disasters (Cruz et al. 2006), extreme risks and human extinction (Tonn & MacGregor 2009), and high impact low probability events (Ord et al. 2010). While the last view of systemic risk (high impact with low probability event) comes closest to a definition, no coherent understanding of systemic risk yet exists. Arguments for post-normal approaches to science and decision-making have been made in the literature, especially so for systemic risk (or close terms), but the explicit treatment of systemic risk so far is limited to case studies and selective areas of threats in the future. It seems that catastrophic or systemic risks per se have been of greater interest in the futures literature so far than the methods and tools to deal with them. One stream of literature focuses on a conceptual approach to systemic risk. In this stream, three groups can be distinguished. The first follows a positivistic endeavor akin to classic risk management approaches quantifying systemic risk to make it measurable and in consequence manageable. The second group applies narrative scenario techniques and describes possible future systemic risks. The third class of works considers a classification of the severity of threats to mankind, and aims to identify the most threatening ones. In an attempt to answer the question how much costs are bearable to protect against a catastrophic event, Nakau (2004) proposed a risk evaluation model, which classifies extreme events quantitatively. Based on stochastic probability he introduces tolerable levels of failure probabilities as a sustainability criterion, i.e. how many victims constitute a certain level of impact. Checkley (2009) employed an empirical test that explains the creation of systemic risk in a venture capitalist context, seeing systemic risk as risks affecting all parties. They argue that such risk occurs as mutual funds diversify their investment among several venture capitalists, but those syndicate for investment projects – so, diversification effects are unmade and are thus pseudo, which in turn gives rise to systemic risk. A series of scenario works in 2009 have considered narratives explaining possible paths to the extinction of the human race (see Coates 2009; Goux-Baudiment 2009; Tonn & MacGregor 2009). Tonn & MacGregor (2009) describe a chain of events that can lead to the extinction of the human race over the next 1000 years. Goux-Baudiment (2009) on the other hand imagines a chain of events that could lead to human extinction in only 150 years. He further investigates the human agency in this scenario, and whether and how human interaction could break this disastrous chain of events. Tonn (2009) adds to those perspectives as he derives a theoretically acceptable risk level of human extinction from qualitative criteria (i.e. fairness, unfinished business, and maintaining options). He finds that the objectively acceptable level is lower than the currently (subjectively) expected level and concludes that risk must therefore be reduced. In a different approach, Coates (2009) discussed extreme risks that humankind faces. He developed a classification system for those events, which centers on the severity of extreme events. The approach is similar to Nakau (2004) as it attempts to evaluate severity of risks, but different as it does not rely on quantitative criteria. Coates concludes that a nuclear winter, the use of nuclear weapons, and the eruption of a super-volcano are the most severe threats to civilization and humankind, but that other events such as asteroids also bear some risk. Another stream of literature focuses on the perception and social construction of systemic risk. First, studies look into the paradoxical situation of policy makers to stimulate innovation but also to regulate risks arising from accelerating innovation. This argument is put forward to support post-normal science and decision-making as the appropriate approach to modern (systemic) risk management situations. Then, risk perception biases for catastrophic risk have been examined and ultimately, the classic reductionist treatment of risk management was held responsible for rising occupation with risk in society. Public actors play a paradoxical role in the relationship between risk and innovation, between the interests of the public and private actors (Ravetz, 2003). Ravetz sees accelerating innovation as a necessary tool for private companies to compete in a ‘globalizing knowledge economy’ and the role of the public to ensure an environment in which speedy innovation can take place. On the other hand, public actors need to ensure the safety of new technologies and innovation acting as an agent for their citizens, remaining the source of public trust and safety provider for citizens. Besides this paradoxical role, technological innovation threatens the global environmental system; so, how much technological 7 innovation is desirable and how much risk in it acceptable? Ravetz argues that finding appropriate answers to this question can only be found in a policy-making process that involves the public in dialogues about scientific findings and by disclosing ambiguities in scientific finding, thus embracing policy principles for a post-normal world of science. [Continued (8 pages later)… ] 4. Preliminary state of the art on resilience In contrast to the conventional risk management approach and linear risk paradigm, the search for resilience tends to emphasize that there is no such thing as a ‘zero risk society’ and suggests, instead, that there is a need for groups and organizations to collaborate in building the adaptive capacity that enables the whole system to organize and re-organize in the face of inherent uncertainty, emergence and inevitable surprise. The resilience approach accepts change as inevitable and endemic and focuses on building the adaptive capacity of the system and its ability to re-organize and transform after a disturbance. Resilience is most commonly used to describe the ability of an entity to withstand and respond to shocks in the external environment. The concept of resilience is becoming a core concept in the social and physical sciences and in matters of public policy. Definitions of resilience, however, vary. There is neither scientific nor professional agreement on what constitutes resilience principles and the operationalization of these principles in practice. However, as a general definition of the resilience of a particular system – the ability to maintain critical functions in the face of regular disturbance from a range of shocks (threats) combined with ability to adopt adaptive behavior when facing unknowable or unexampled disturbances – is the commonly used one. Intellectual traditions on resilience are a still emerging and chaotic field, fragmented across different disciplines and professional practices. The concept of 'resilience' has already been constructed in a 10 variety of fields and traditions, including engineering, systems ecology, political sciences, management and organization theory, cultural theory, complex adaptive systems, cybernetics and psychology. An initial review of the literatures relating to resilience reveals a fragmented field. In social ecology, resilience is concerned with the longer-term survival and functioning of ecosystems – species, populations and services in a changing or fluctuating operating environment. The social ecology approach introduced by Holling (1973) argues ecological systems are non-deterministic because of inherent complexity. characterizes the ecosystem as complex set of elements and parts existing in dynamic interrelationship and interdependency. The key contribution of the ecological view of resilience is to provide a focus on the systemic nature of the problems and on the longer-term demands on policy and management. It emphasizes the need to keep options open, while appreciating heterogeneity and keeping a broader than local view organization – this is in contrast to dominant management approaches which are concerned with compartmentalizing issues, limiting change to the margins and views of the future rooted in attempt to preserve the present. **The critical distinction is that between resilience and stability**. The stability/equilibrium paradigm approaches the future with the aim of strengthening the status quo by making the present system “resilient to change” and aiming to achieve stability and constancy. In the management literature, the focus when using the resilience concept is on the persistence and survival of individual businesses and institutions in face of change. A bulk of the management literature on organizations focuses on the strategies for individual businesses to be ‘resilient’ to change -- on innovation, experimentation and leadership to ensure survival and growth of a specific institution/business -- however the ecosystem perspective requires us to think about the health and of the forest and the services its provides rather than the role of individual species! What are the sources of resilience in the system and or an organization? The process of increasing resilience is different from optimization and improving system performance in existing conditions – what organizational characteristics build resilience. Successful adaptation requires for individual organizations, agents and businesses to continue to full fill their own goal and function but must also include measures of promoting adaptive capacity of the system. Despite the richness in conceptual thinking underpinning the concept of resilience, there is limited evidence of how groups, organizations are societies are translating the notion of resilience into practice. The constructivist tradition in social theory argues that social response is non- deterministic because of plural perception and the negotiations of values, cultures, choices and epistemologies. The managers are part of the system that is being managed and define the system and its characteristics in different ways. Understanding the loss, creation and maintenance of resilience through the process of co-discovery – scientists, policy makers, practitioners, stakeholders and citizens is at the heart of building the capacity to deal with whatever the future might bring. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some societies are organizing for resilience. For example, both the governments of Canada and Singapore have resilience as the goal of their national strategic plans. There is a nascent literature emerging, as yet unmapped, on operationalizing resilience beyond the organizational level. For example, in an approach to adapting an urban delta to uncertain climate change, Wardekkar et al. (2009) identify five options for resilience: (1) homeostasis: incorporation of feedback loops; (2) omnivory: having several different ways of fulfilling needs; (3) flatness: preventing a system from becoming too top heavy enables more effective localized responses, self-reliance and self-organization; (4) buffering: the ability to absorb disturbances to a certain extent and (5) redundancy: having multiple options – routes, supply chains, etc – so that if one fails, others can be used. 11 The resilience frame opens the opportunity to think in terms of nonlinear and non-deterministic futures and, in doing so, to displace practices in probable futureswith plausible and preferable futures. The resilience frame also invites attention to realizing transformation, rather than future proofing of established structures, identities and values. It invites consideration of the uncertainty as irreducible and inherent, going beyond the lack of knowledge and encompassing ambiguity and ignorance.

#### Our alternative is to interrogate the scholarship of the 1ac - the method of evidence selection used by the 1AC makes effective debate impossible

Stevens 2007 (Alex Stevens, Senior Researcher-European Institute of Social Services, School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research, Keynes College, University of Kent, “Survival of the Ideas that Fit: An Evolutionary Analogy for the Use of Evidence in Policy” Social Policy and Society 6:1, 25–35)

The proposed evolutionary analogy goes beyond the political/tactical model by also helping to explain how evidence can be used selectively to further the interests of powerful social groups, without relying solely on the deliberate connivance of policymakers. It sees social structure, in addition to political tactics, as important in supporting selection in the use of evidence. It uses an evolutionary approach to explain the pattern of selection. It starts from the assumption that a variety of ideas come from evidence and compete for attention in policy, as genes arise and compete for survival. The ideas may be facts, findings or recommendations that have been produced by academics, journalists, think tanks, pressure groups or others. Some of these ideas fit the interests of powerful groups and some do not. Ideas that do fit will find powerful supporters. Others will not. Those ideas that fit will therefore have groups and individuals that can carry them into policy, as would a gene be reproduced if it finds a place in organisms that survive. The ideas that do not fit will tend not to be picked up by people who have the power to translate them into policy. This evolutionary advantage leads to the survival of the ideas that fit. The major advantage of this analogy is that it illuminates the biased use of evidence without relying on policy makers to be irrational, or the ability of powerful social groups to coordinate a campaign to ignore unhelpful research. Mechanisms of selection In contrast to the reproduction of genes, it is not the idea that gives its carrier the increased potential to survive. And it is not, as Dawkins suggested for memes, that the idea is ‘advantageous to itself’ (Dawkins, 1976: 200). Rather, it is the power of the carriers, and the choices they make on which bits of evidence to pick up, that confer advantage to ideas that suit the interests of powerful groups. A similarity to biological evolution is that the process of selection is complicated, messy and sometimes brutal. Powerful social groups are not monolithic. They have diverse memberships and divergent interests. They struggle over what policies will be proclaimed and implemented, and use various mechanisms to attempt to ensure that the evidence that suits their purpose comes to be recognised as legitimate. Policy makers, businesses, political parties and pressure groups may ‘trawl’: fishing for evidence, hauling in the bits that suit their needs, and throwing back those that do not. They may also ‘farm’ evidence, by, for example, commissioning research, but only publishing and using those parts of it that meet the criteria that they set for the look and flavour of the evidence produced. Repetition is a useful tool in ensuring that attention is given to useful evidence. Groups that have a voice in the policy process can repeatedly refer to bits of evidence, which may be ripped out of context and based on methodologically suspect research. Through repetition, such evidence can become part of the accepted body of knowledge in a policy area. Powerful groups can also use ‘flak’ (Chomsky and Herman, 1988) to attack, silence or discredit evidence that comes into the public arena, but is not helpful to their interests. And they may be able to impose ‘strain’ (Chambliss, 1976) on people and organisations that produce and advocate unhelpful evidence, who may find that doing so is not conducive to a successful career or to organisational survival. There are limits to the research questions that can be asked that reinforce selection. These include limits that are set by legal, professional and ideological boundaries. Different groups will also have different narratives of how social problems arise and how they should be solved. These narratives provide a frame into which evidence must fit if it is to enter policy. The extent to which social groups can impose their own narratives and frames on a debate depends on their relative legal, professional, financial and ideological power (Green, 2000; Hajer, 1993). Limits are also set by the decisions of those people who pay for research on what they are interested in buying. Those groups with the most power in society will be most able to implement these mechanisms, and so bring attention to research that suits them, and encourage the ignorance of research that does not. This does not mean that their power dominates the use of evidence entirely. Weaker social groups, including trade unions, environmental pressure groups, other campaigning bodies and self-organisations of the poor and socially marginalised may also attempt to make these mechanisms work for them. However, they have less access to the sources of research and its dissemination; they are less able to impose their interpretations of research evidence on a wider public. They have less opportunity to trawl or farm research, to create flak, to repeat favourable evidence or to impose strain on those who produce or disseminate unhelpful research. And they have less of a role in framing policy. Selection in action So far, this evolutionary analogy has not been rigorously tested against actual uses of evidence in practice. It is presented here in order to invite discussion of how it may apply to various areas of social policy. However, it is quite easy to find illustrative examples of the selective use of evidence in policy making; especially, it seems, in crime, immigration and health policies. The British Drug Treatment and Testing Orders (DTTO, a sentence for drug dependent offenders introduced in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, since replaced by the Drug Rehabilitation Requirement) were inspired by the expansion of drug courts in the USA. A report by one of the instigators of the DTTO policy (Russell, 1994) trawls in references to evaluations of drug courts, all of which are positive, without mentioning any of the negative evaluations, or mentioning that the positive evaluations offer good examples of selection bias; basing their results solely on the proportion of people who completed the programmes, and often comparing them to those who dropped out early, in defiance of accepted methodological standards (Stevens et al., 2005). Before the DTTO was rolled-out across England and Wales, a study of three pilot areas was commissioned which concluded ‘we could hardly portray the pilot programmes as unequivocally successful’ (Turnbull et al., 2000: 87). The response in terms of policy was typical of the ‘farming’ mechanism. The negative findings were not publicised and the roll-out went ahead. A second example of selection is the use of research on the impact of asylum policies in Europe on the number of asylum seekers. This research found that direct pre-entry measures (e.g. visas, sanctions on airlines) have had the greatest impact on the number of asylum claimants. But ‘measures such as reception facilities, detention and the withdrawal of welfare benefits appear to have had much more limited impact’ (Zetter et al., 2003: xiii). Restrictive policies also have counter-effects, including increased illegal immigration and displacement of asylum flows to other countries. The official response provided examples of ‘farming’ and of ‘strain’. Publication of the research was delayed for two years, findings on the lack of effect of indirect controls and on their counter-effects were ignored and such controls continued to be tightened (e.g. in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the Asylum and Immigration Act 2004). One of the authors of this research wrote in a letter to The Guardian that this was ‘part of a general and worrying trend that academic research is being used to buttress government policies in a way that is illegitimate and which depends upon an extremely partial reading of research results’ (Griffiths, 2003). So far, these examples show only that politicians and policy makers are capable of making selective use of the research that they commission. They could fit with the political/tactical view of policy-makers making irrational uses of evidence for their own purposes. However, they should be viewed within the context of argumentation over policy that occurs around as well as within the state. The people whose interests are most directly harmed by these selective uses of evidence, being drug-using offenders and would-be immigrants and asylum seekers, are among the least powerful in these arguments. On the other hand, powerful interest groups have an interest in the use of evidence to bolster such policies. Powerful social groups have, for example, long benefited from the use of migrant workers, both as cheap labour to boost profits and as scapegoats for social problems that result from inequality (Winder, 2005). As the 2005 UK general election showed, the government faces a great deal of external pressure to be seen to be tough on immigration. Opposition parties and right-wing newspapers can target a great deal of flak at politicians and researchers who make the case for immigration. A rational debate over the pros and cons of asylum policy is unlikely to occur in such a context. The reasons for this are not merely tactical, but also structural, as it is social structure which explains the relative power that groups can bring to these arguments and processes of evidence selection. External influences on the use of evidence are clearer in some examples from the field of health and food policy. In 2003, the World Health Organisation sought to create international guidelines that stated that daily intake of sugar should not exceed 10 grammes per person, based on the evidence of the damage done by excessive consumption to human health. This lead to the imposition of heavy ‘strain’ on the WHO, which faced criticism, including calls for the resignation of its Director from US officials, who were themselves pressured by the sugar corporations who are major donors to the political parties of the USA (Boseley, 2003). After these pressures had been imposed, the 10g recommended daily limit on sugar intake was not included in the final document (World Health Organization, 2003). In the UK, there is the example of the government's alcohol harm reduction strategy. The government initially commissioned a group of 17 independent experts to provide the evidence on which to base this strategy. Their considered view was that reducing alcohol-related harm should involve limiting its availability and increasing its price. This conclusion would obviously not be popular, either with many voters, or with the alcohol industry. One of the ways the alcohol industry seeks to maximise its profits is by funding the Portman Group. This was the only ‘alcohol misuse’ organisation mentioned in the government's strategy, which adopted the ideas and language of the alcohol industry. Alcohol Concern, the Medical Council on Alcohol and the National Addiction Centre were not referred to (McNeill, 2004). Eventually, the government published a strategy that bore so little relation to the evidence-based recommendations of the experts that several of them were moved to publish their own report, which contradicted the government's strategy (Academy of Medical Sciences, 2004). It seems that this is a clear example where external pressure on government by a powerful group has influenced the use of evidence in policy. Internationally, the issues of genetically modified (GM) organisms and climate change also provide examples of the use of trawling, farming, flak, strain, repetition and selective framing by actors outside the state. Much of the research on GM food is funded by the corporations who hope to profit from its application. Several researchers have found that raising questions over the safety and efficacy of GM food is not conducive to security of tenure in Universities that are funded by these corporations. For example, Dr Arpad Pusztai's research suggesting that GM potatoes may be poisonous to rats (Ewen and Pusztai, 1999) led to him losing his job, and to threats that the editor of The Lancet, which published some of this research, would also lose his. Dr Ignacia Chapela was also targeted for flak and strain when he published an article in Nature reporting contamination of native corn in Mexico by a GM variety (Quist and Chapela, 2001). He was subsequently refused tenure at the University of California, where a number of colleagues criticised his work and benefited from a multi-million dollar deal with the biotechnology company Novartis.3 Corporations that control the production of raw materials are also extremely powerful in the field of energy policy, which has the greatest effect on climate change. The material interests of these corporations are damaged by international policies such as the Kyoto protocol. Given the potential damage of Kyoto to oil company profits, it is not surprising that the tiny minority of scientists who deny the role of human activity in climate change have found ready supporters in the oil industry. More worrying is that the most powerful government on Earth has pressured its own scientists to misrepresent their own findings in order to support the oil companies’ position (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2004) and continues to dilute international efforts to combat climate change (Townsend, 2005). It should be noted that in none of these cases is the interest of any one group able fully to determine the use of evidence. Nor is it the case that evidence does not influence the terms in which these controversies are played out. Debate over DTTOs, immigration policy, GM food and global warming is alive and well. Research evidence is not absent, but crucial to the development of these debates. However, its use is not often directly linear, ideally enlightened or purely tactical. These are selected examples, but they are by no means isolated. In several fields, it is evident that structural, as well as tactical interests of powerful social groups often shape the use that is made of evidence in ways that pervert the promise of evidence-based policy making. Avoiding bias While scientific evidence may not be accepted unquestioningly as a clear, objective source, there is a body of scientific evidence. The process of scientific production makes this available for discovery and analysis through various forms of synthesis. Through open debate over the results of such reviews, some positions can be found to be false, in that they offer inadequate accounts of the phenomena they attempt to explain (Layder, 1998). Examples of propositions that the balance of scientific evidence has found to be untrue are that Saddam Hussein was storing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003 (Powell, 2003), that ‘nothing works’ in preventing criminal recidivism (Martinson, 1979), that smoking tobacco does not increase risks of cancer (Tobacco Institute Research Committee, 1954) and that human activity is not contributing to global warming (see van den Hove, le Menestrel, and de Bettignies, 2002). The existence of proponents of alternative views shows that it is possible to question the mainstream and to insert dissident positions into the debate. But acting as if these propositions are true has been and will be disastrous. If we are to have any prospect of improving the human condition, then we need to continue to develop knowledge (of which research evidence is one element) that can inform action; knowledge that we can use until superior explanations and possibilities arise. The idea of evidence-based policy is that this will happen. It often fails in practice, not only because research evidence is contested, but because its use is affected by processes of selection that make it less likely that superior explanations and solutions will be put into practice.

### Off

#### The affirmative is a continuing symptom of the dangers of seeking invulnerability. Super power syndrome causes us to project our feelings of insecurity and vulnerability onto the world stage.

Lifton 3 - professor of psychiatry at Harvard [Robert Jay Lifton, Visiting Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, previously Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at the Graduate School and Director of The Center on Violence and Human Survival at John Jay College of Criminal Justice at the City University of New York, 2003 (Superpower Syndrome: America’s Apocalyptic Confrontation With The World, Published by Thunder’s Mouth Press / Nation Books, ISBN 1560255129, p. 125-130)]

It is almost un-American to be vulnerable. As a people, we pride ourselves on being able to stand up to anything, solve all problems. We have long had a national self-image that involves an ability to call forth reservoirs or strength when we need it, and a sense of a protected existence peculiar to America in an otherwise precarious world. In recent times we managed, after all, to weather the most brutal century in human history relatively unscathed. THE BLESSED COUNTRY Our attitude stems partly from geography. We have always claimed a glorious aloneness thanks to what has been called the “Free security” of the two great oceans which separate us from dangerous upheavals in Europe and Asia. While George Washington was not the isolationist he is sometimes represented to be, he insisted on his celebrated Farewell Address of 1796, “’Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world.” That image has been embraced, and often simplified or distorted, by politicians ever since. (He warned against permanent alliances, not alliances in general).

The idea of our separateness and safety from faraway conflicts has had importance from the time of the early settlers, many of whom left Europe to escape political religious, or legal threats or entanglements. Even if one came as an adventurer or an empire-builder, one was leaving a continent of complexity and conflict for a land whose remoteness could support new beginnings. Abraham Lincoln absolutized that remoteness and security from outside attack in order to stress that our only danger came from ourselves: “All the armies of Europe, Asia and Africa combined, with all the treasure of the earth (our own excepted) in their military chest; with a Buonaparte for a commander, could not by force, take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on the Blue Ridge, in a trial of a thousand years.” However much the world has shrunk technologically in the last half century, and however far-ranging our own superpower forays, that sense of geographic invulnerability has never left us. We have seen ourselves as not only separate from but different from the rest of the world, a special nation among nations. That sense of American exceptionalism was intensely observed by Alexis de Tocqueville, the brilliant French politician and writer, in the early nineteenth century. In de Tocqueville’s view of America, “A course almost without limits, a field without horizon, is revealed: the human spirit rushes forward and traverses [it] in every direction.” American exceptionalism has always been, as the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset has pointed out, “a double-edged sword.” In the psychological life of Americans it has been bound up with feelings of unique virtue, strength, and success. But this has sometimes led Americans to be “utopian moralists, who press hard to institutionalize virtue, to destroy evil people, and eliminate wicked institutions and practices.” That subjective exceptionalism has been vividly expressed in the historian Richard Hofstadter’s observation, “It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be one.” At the time of the Puritans, sentiments of exceptionalism were expressed in biblical terms: America was an “Arcadian image of the New World … an Eden from which the serpent and forbidden trees had been thoroughly excluded,” and “a new Promised Land and a New Jerusalem.” The language was that of a postapocalyptic utopia, and remnants of such sentiments persist whenever we speak of ourselves in more secular terms as the “new world.” Important to this feeling of exceptionalism has been a deep sense that America offered unparalleled access to regenerative power. As Richard Slotkin explains: “The first colonists saw in America an opportunity to regenerate [end page 127] their fortunes, their spirits, and the power of their church and nation,” though “the means to that regeneration ultimately became the means of violence.” Even when Americans played what has been called a “shell game of identity,” they could experience an unlimited capacity for renewal—endless new beginnings as individuals or as a nation. Slotkin speaks of a new relationship to authority in this new world. While “in Europe all men were under authority; in America all men dreamed they had the power to become authority.” These claims of new authority extended to the country as a whole, to America’s authority among nations—a claim to new national authority that was expanded over time thanks to America’s considerable achievements—economic, technological, scientific, and cultural. American exceptionalism has often had the overall psychological quality of a sense of ourselves as a blessed people, immune from the defeats and sufferings of others. But underneath that sense there had to be a potential chink in our psychological armor—which was a deep-seated if hidden sense of vulnerability. OMNIPOTENCE AND VULNERABILITY Ironically, superpower syndrome projects the problem of American vulnerability onto the world stage. A superpower is perceived as possessing more than natural power. [end page 128] (In this sense it comes closer to resembling the comic-strip hero Superman than the Nietzschean Superman.) For a nation, its leaders, or even its ordinary citizens to enter into the superpower syndrome is to lay claim to omnipotence, to power that is unlimited, which is ultimately power over death. At the heart of the superpower syndrome then is the need to eliminate a vulnerability that, as the antithesis of omnipotence, contains the basic contradiction of the syndrome. For vulnerability can never be eliminated, either by a nation or an individual. In seeking its elimination, the superpower finds itself on a psychological treadmill. The idea of vulnerability is intolerable, the fact of it irrefutable. One solution is to maintain an illusion of invulnerability. But the superpower then runs the danger of taking increasingly draconian actions to sustain that illusion. For to do otherwise would be to surrender the cherished status of superpower. Other nations have experiences in the world that render them and their citizens all too aware of the essential vulnerability of life on earth. They also may be influenced by religious and cultural traditions (far weaker in the United States) that emphasize vulnerability as an aspect of human mortality. No such reality can be accepted by those clinging to a sense of omnipotence. At issue is the experience of death anxiety, which is the strongest manifestation of vulnerability. Such a deep-seated [end page 129] sense of vulnerability can sometimes be acknowledged by the ordinary citizens of a superpower, or even at times by its leaders, who may admit, for instance, that there is no guaranteed defense against terrorist acts. But those leaders nonetheless remain committed to eliminating precisely that vulnerability—committed, that is, to the illusory goal of invulnerability. When that goal is repeatedly undermined—whether by large-scale terrorist acts like 9/11, or as at present by militant resistance to American hegemony in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East—both the superpower and the world it acts upon may become dangerously destabilized.

#### This results in a politics of pre-emption, massive violence against others, and terminal conflict escalation.

Massumi 7 (Brian, Communication Department of the Université de Montréal , “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption”)

Fear is always a good reason to go politically conditional. **Fear** **is the palpable action in the present of a threatening future cause**. It acts just as palpably whether the threat is determinate or not. It weakens your resolve, creates stress, lowers consumer confidence, and may ultimately lead to individual and/or economic paralysis. **To avoid the paralysis**, which would make yourself even more of a target and carry the fear to even higher level, **you must simply act**. In Bush administration parlance, you "go kinetic."6 You leap into action on a level with the potential that frightens you. You do that, once again, by inciting the potential to take an actual shape you can respond to. You trigger a production of what you fear. **You turn the** objectively **indeterminate cause into an actual effect so you can actually deal with it in some way.** Any time you feel the need to act, then all you have to do is actuate a fear. The production of the effect follows as smoothly as a reflex. This affective dynamic is still very much in place, independent of Rumsfeld's individual fate. It will remain in place as long as fear and remains politically actuatable. **The logic of preemption operates on this** affective **plane**, in this proliferative or ontogenetic way: in a way that contributes to the reflex production of the specific being of the threat. **You're afraid Iraq is a breeding ground for terrorists? It could have been.** If it could have been, it would have been. **So go ahead, make it one**. "Bring 'em on," the President said, following Hollywood-trained reflex. He knew it in his "guts." He couldn't have gone wrong. His reflex was right. **Because "now we can all agree" that Iraq is in actual fact a breeding ground for "terrrorists". That just goes to prove that the potential was always there.** Before, there was doubt in some quarters that Saddam had to be removed from power. Some agreed he had to go, some didn't. Now we can all agree. It was right to remove him because doing so made Iraq become what it always could have been. And that's the truth. Truth, in this new world order, is by nature retroactive. Fact grows conditionally in the affective soil of an indeterminately present futurity. It becomes objective as that present reflexively plays out, as a effect of the preemptive action taken. The reality-based community wastes time studying empirical reality, the Bushites said: "we create it." And because of that, "we" the preemptors will always be right. We always will have been right to preempt, because we have objectively produced a recursive truth-effect for your judicious study. And while you are looking back studying the truth of it, we will have acted with reflex speed again, effecting a new reality. 7 We will always have had no choice but to prosecute the "war on terror," ever more vigilantly and ever more intensely on every potential front. We, preemptors, are the producers of your world. Get used to it. The War in Iraq is a success to the extent that it made the productivity of the preemptive "war on terror" a self-perpetuating movement. Even if the US were to withdraw from Iraq tomorrow, the war would have to continue on other fronts no matter who controls Congress or who is in the White House. It would have to continue in Afghanistan, for example, where the assymetrical tactics perfected in Iraq are now being applied to renew the conflict there. Or in Iran, which also always could have/would have been a terrorist breeding ground. Or it could morph and move to the Mexican-US border, itself morphed into a distributed frontline proliferating throughout the territory in the moving form of "illegal immigration". **On the indefinite Homeland Security front of** a protieform **war, who knows what threats may be spinelessly incubating** where, abetted by those who lack the "backbone" to go kinetic. **Preemption** is like deterrence in that it **combines a proprietary epistemology with a unique ontology in such a way as to make present a future cause that sets a self-perpetuating movement into operation**. Its differences from deterrence hinge on its taking objectively indeterminate or potential threat as its self-constitutive cause rather than fully formed and specified threat. It situates itself on the ground of ontogenetic potential. There, rather than deterring the feared effect, it actualizes the potential in a shape to which it hopes it can respond. It assumes a proliferation of potential threats, and mirrors that capacity in its own operation. It becomes proliferative. It assumes the objective imbalance of a far-from-equilibrium state as a permanent condition. Rather than trying to right the imbalance, it seizes it as an opportunity for itself. Preemption also sets a race in motion. But this is a race run on the edge of chaos. It is a race of movement-flushing, detection, perception, and affective actuation, run in irreparably chaotic or quasi-chaotic conditions. The race of preemption has any number of laps, each ending in the actual effecting of a threat. Each actualization of a threat triggers the next lap, as a continuation of the first in the same direction, or in another way in a different field. Deterrence revolved around an objective cause. Preemption revolves around a proliferative effect. Both are operative logics. The operative logic of deterrence, however, remained causal even as it displaced its cause's effect. **Preemption** is an effective operative logic rather than a causal operative logic. Since its ground is potential, there is no actual cause for it to organize itself around. It **compensates for the absence of an actual cause by producing an actual effect in its place**. This it makes the motor of its movement: it converts an absent or virtual cause really, directly into a taking-actual-effect. It does this affectively. It uses affect to effectively trigger a virtual causality.8 Preemption is when the futurity of unspecified threat is affectively held in the present in a perpetual state of potential emergence(y) so that a movement of actualization may be triggered that is not only self-propelling but also effectively, indefinitely, ontologically productive, because it works from a virtual cause whose potential no single actualization exhausts. Preemption's operational parameters mean that is never univocal. It operates in the element of vagueness and objective uncertainty. Due to its proliferative nature, it cannot be monolithic. Its logic cannot close in around its self-causing as the logic deterrence does. It includes an essential openness in its productive logic.9 It incites its adversary to take emergent form. It then strives to become as proteiform as its ever-emergent adversary can be. It is as shape-shifting as it is self-driving. It infiltrates across boundaries, sweeping up existing formations in its own transversal movement. Faced with gravity-bound formations too inertial for it to sweep up and carry off with its own operative logic, it contents itself with opening windows of opportunity to pass through. This is the case with the domestic legal and juridical structure in the US. It can't sweep that away. But it can build into that structure escape holes for itself. These take the form of formal provisions vastly expanding the power of the executive, in the person of the president in his role as commander-in-chief, to declare states of exception which suspend the normal legal course in order to enable a continued flow of preemptive action.10 **Preemption stands for conflict unlimited: the potential for peace amended to become a perpetual state of undeclared war.** This is the "permanent state of emergency" so presciently described by Walter Benjamin. In current Bush administration parlance, it has come to be called "Long War" replacing the Cold War: a preemptive war with an in-built tendency to be never-ending. Deterrence produced asymmetrical conflict as a by-product. The MADly balanced East-West bipolarity spun off a North-South sub-polarity. This was less a polarity than an axis of imbalance. The "South" was neither a second Western First nor another Eastern Second. It was an anomalous Third. In this chaotic " Third World ," local conflicts prefiguring the present "imbalance of terror" proliferated. The phrase "the war on terror" was in fact first popularized by Richard Nixon in 1972 in response to the attack at the Munich Olympics when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict spectacularly overspilled northward. Asymmetrical conflicts, however, were perceivable by the reigning logic of deterrence only as a reflection of itself. The dynamic of deterrence were overlaid upon them. Their heterogeneity was overcoded by the familiar US-Soviet duality. Globally such conflicts figured only as opportunities to reproduce the worldwide balance of terror on a reduced scale. The strategy of "containment" adopted toward them was for the two sides in the dominant dyad to operate in each local theater through proxies in such a way that their influence, on the whole, balanced out. "I decided," Nixon said after Munich , "that we must maintain a balance."11 He did not, as Bush did after 9-11, decide to skew things by going unilaterally "kinetic." The rhetoric of the "war on terror" fell into abeyance during the remainder of the 1970s, as Southern asymmetries tended to be overcoded as global rebalancings, and going kinetic was "contained" to the status of local anomaly.

#### Their entire thesis of the terrorism advantage presupposes the justness of our strategy abroad - this obscures the causes of the war of terror, turns the case and results in massive violence.

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The genealogies and chronologies of these two contemporary wars infinitely complicate understanding of the violent post-9/11 world disordering. Protagonists of both the wars maintain that theirs is a response to prior situations or histories of "terrorism." It is not easy, even as a matter of simple chronology, to say which one comes first. The salient agents of the "war of terror" offer assorted reasons/justifications for this war as a response to an underlying war of "terror," even a series of these. They seem to justify their actions as a response to the recent but still ancient (this awkward phrasing illustrates the complexity of periodization) wrongs unleashed by the previous histories of wars of terror. In contrast, the protagonists of the "war on terror" regard theirs as a "second war," which may not have happened at all without the first (that is, the "war of terror"). The second war, it is loudly said, occurs because the first severely threatens the futures of a global capitalist driven new-human, even post-human, civilization.' The second war has no use for any scrupulous regard for the causes that underscore the first war. By the common consent of "civilized nations" (that is, the newly progressive Eurocentric state formation manifest through the "coalitions of willing states") the existing body of normative legal restraints concerning the use of force do not, as we see later, apply; in their place some newly fangled doctrines of "pre-emptive" war and "regime change" now stand uneasily installed. This second war has scant regard for its own, otherwise endlessly proclaimed, Euroamerican "gift" of human rights with respect to the benighted "failed states," exemplars of what Gayatri Spivak now troublesomely labels "failed decolonization."6 How may philosophical thinking or method help clarify the contending beliefs and performances? To start with, one may describe the situation as posing the problem of causality in a way that enables some preliminary means of describing causes and effects. The old Aristotelian categories of causality may suggest to us the distinction between proximate cause and efficient or final cause. In that case, one may say that 9/11 constituted the proximate cause of the "war on terror" just as the efficient cause is provided, for the protagonists of the "war of terror," by the past histories of "terror." But this language does not altogether avoid a "linear, deterministic, and nondialectical logic of causality," which assumes causes as originally given; following a Hegelian dialectical understanding, Angelica Nuzzo recently concludes that Terrorism (as well as its symbol, 9/11) is ... the true effect or the real consequence of the war against terrorism that the United States has been waging for decades in numerous parts of the world. In other words, war is the true cause of that which it declares it is fighting-namely, terrorism.' Put another way, "dialectic shows that terrorism is an effect, not a cause," with the consequence that "politics aimed at opposing" the war on terror will "have to look to reasons that lead to the exercise of violence and will have to fight the effect along with the causes that produce it."'8 Nuzzo suggests that a dialectical understanding remains "essential if we want to reach a nonideologicial and noninstrumental definition of terrorism" and if we want to "regain the historical-and oppose the fictional-sense of the reality in which we live."9 In this sense, the struggle consists in providing "definitions" that at least speak to aspects of historical and structural domination and denial of human rights and justice perpetuated by the United States as well as the Soviet Union (and their allies) in the twentieth century, and by the colonial and imperialistic Eurocentric global hegemons in the three centuries preceding the current waging of the "war on terror." On the other hand, philosopher Alain Badiou recently offered the insight that the word "terrorist," and the adjective "terrorism," has "no neutral readability," precisely because it "dispenses with a reasoned examination of political situations, of their causes and consequences. "'1 International lawpersons who have struggled over many generations to fashion approaches towards an acceptable normative description of "terrorism" may find this insight congenial.11 However, they know as well as the philosophers the difficulties that attend "reasoned examination of political situations"; there remain at hand many diverse reasoned analyses that frame very different understanding of the causes and consequences of "terrorism." They may, however, feel perplexed by Alain Badiou's accentuation of "reasoned examination," on the one hand, and his further analysis, on the other, of the ways in which the "crime of New York and the following battles" constitute the "disjunctive synthesis of two nihilisms.' 12 The overall result of both the "wars" then, for Badiou, remains a register constituted by the "bloody and nihilistic games of power without purpose and without truth., 13 If so, understanding "terror" in ways that destruct "the circuits of nihilism"'14 constitutes a new task for philosophers, international lawpersons, and human rights activism.

#### Our alternative is to ground our politics within our vulnerability - this critical to engaging with others meaningfully.

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Stepping out of that syndrome would also include surrendering the claim of certainty, of ownership of truth and reality. That ownership gives rise to deadly righteousness, with a claim to illumination so absolute as to transcend ordinary restraints against mass violence. The healthier alternative is an acceptance of some measure of ambiguity, of inevitable elements of confusion and contradiction, [end page 196] whether in relation to large historical events or in matters of personal experience. This would include a more nuanced approach to Islam and Islamist thought and behavior that allows for the possibility of evolution and change. It is often claimed that no such acceptance of ambiguity is possible because superpowers, like nations, like people, are uncomfortable with it, that the tendency is always to seek clarity and something close to certainty. But this assumption may well underestimate our psychological capabilities. Ambiguity, in fact, is central to human function, recognized and provided for by cultural institutions and practices everywhere. American society in particular has cultivated the kinds of ambiguity that go with multiplicity and with shifting populations and frontiers. I have tried in my past work to formulate a version of the self as many-sided, flexible, and capable of change and transformation. This protean self (named after Proteus, the Greek sea god who was capable of taking on many shapes) stands in direct contrast to the fundamentalist or apocalyptic self. Indeed, the closed fundamentalist self and its apocalyptic impulses can be understood as a reaction to protean tendencies, which are widely abroad in our world as a response to the complexities of recent history. Any contemporary claim to absolute certainty, then, is compensatory, an artificial plunge into totalism that seeks an escape from the ambiguity that so pervades our historical legacy. American society is more volatile on these matters than [end page 197] many suspect. Over the previous century and at the beginning of a new one, we have been undergoing waves of contending forms of populism—pendulum swings between totalistic impulses and more open, if less clearly formulated, protean principles. How this psychohistorical struggle will develop we have no way of knowing, but we need hardly give up on ambiguity, or on our capacity to combine it with strongly held ethical principles. There is a real sense in which elements of ambiguity are necessary to our well-being. They certainly are necessary to the well-being of our nation, and of the world. To live with ambiguity is to accept vulnerability. American aspirations toward superpower invulnerability have troubling parallels in Islamist visions of godly power. Surrendering the dream of invulnerability, more enlightened American leaders could begin to come to terms with the idea that there will always be some danger in our world, that reasonable and measured steps can be taken to limit that danger and combat threats of violence, but that invulnerability is itself a perilous illusion. To cast off that illusion would mean removing the psychological pressure of sustaining a falsified vision of the world, as opposed to taking a genuine place in the real one. Much of this has to do with accepting the fact that we die, a fact not altered by either superpower militarism or religious fanaticism. A great part of apocalyptic violence is in the service of a vast claim of immortality, a claim that [end page 198] can, in the end, often be sustained only by victimizing large numbers of people. Zealots come to depend upon their mystical, spiritual, or military vision to protect themselves from death, and to provide immortality through killing.

### Solvency

#### Obama will circumvent the plan --- empirics prove

Levine 12 - Law Clerk; J.D., May 2012, University of Michigan Law School (David Levine, 2013 SURVEY OF BOOKS RELATED TO THE LAW: BOOK NOTICE: A TIME FOR PRESIDENTIAL POWER? WAR TIME AND THE CONSTRAINED EXECUTIVE, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 1195)

Both the Declare War Clause n49 and the War Powers Resolution n50 give Congress some control over exactly when "wartime" exists. While the U.S. military was deployed to Libya during the spring and summer of 2011, the Obama Administration advanced the argument that, under the circumstances, it was bound by neither clause. n51 If Dudziak is worried about "war's presence as an ongoing feature of American democracy" (p. 136), Libya is a potent case study with implications for the use of force over the coming decades. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants to Congress the power to "declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water." n52 Although there is substantial debate on the precise scope of these powers, n53 this clause at least provides some measure of congressional control over significant commitments of U.S. forces to battle. However, it has long been accepted that presidents, acting pursuant to the commander-in-chief power, may "introduce[] armed forces into situations in which they encounter[], or risk[] encountering, hostilities, but which [are] not "wars' in either the common meaning or the [\*1207] constitutional sense." n54 Successive administrations have adopted some variant of that view and have invariably deployed U.S. forces abroad in a limited manner based on this inherent authority. n55 The Obama Administration has adopted this position - that a president has inherent constitutional authority to deploy forces outside of war - and even sought to clarify it. In the Office of Legal Counsel's ("OLC") memo to President Obama on the authority to use military force in Libya, n56 the Administration acknowledged that the Declare War Clause is a "possible constitutionally-based limit on ... presidential authority to employ military force." n57 The memo reasoned that the Constitution speaks only to Congress's ability to shape engagements that are "wars," and that presidents have deployed forces in limited contexts from the earliest days of the Union. n58 Acknowledging those facts, the memo concluded that the constitutional limit on congressional power must be the conceptual line between war and not war. In locating this boundary, the memo looked to the "anticipated nature, scope, and duration" of the conflict to which President Obama was introducing forces. n59 OLC found that the "war" standard "will be satisfied only by prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period." n60 The Obama Administration's position was not out of sync with previous presidential practice - the Declare War Clause did not require congressional approval prior to executive deployment of troops. In analyzing the "nature, scope, and duration" questions, the memo looked first to the type of missions that U.S. forces would be engaged in. The air missions envisioned for the Libya operation did not pose the threat of withdrawal difficulty or escalation risk that might indicate "a greater need for approval [from Congress] at the outset." n61 The nature of the mission, then, was not similar to full "war." Similarly, the scope of the intended operation was primarily limited, at the time the memo was written, to enforcing a no-fly zone. n62 Consequently, [\*1208] the operation's expected duration was not long. Thus, concluded OLC, "the use of force by the United States in Libya [did not rise] to the level of a "war' in the constitutional sense." n63 While this conclusion may have been uncontroversial, it highlights Dudziak's concerns over the manipulation of the idea of "wartime," concerns that were heightened by the Obama Administration's War Powers Resolution analysis. Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973 in an attempt to rein in executive power in the wake of the Vietnam War. n64 The resolution provides that the president shall "in every possible instance ... consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." n65 Additionally, when the president sends U.S. forces "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated," the resolution requires him to submit a report to Congress describing the circumstances of the deployment and the expected involvement of U.S. troops in the "hostilities." n66 Within sixty days of receiving that report, Congress must either declare war or in some other way extend the deployment; in the absence of some ratifying action, the resolution requires that the president withdraw U.S. forces. n67 Though eschewing the plainly confrontational route of directly challenging Congress's power under the War Powers Resolution, the Obama Administration implicitly challenged Congress's ability to affect future operations. In declining to withdraw forces, despite Congress's lack of approving legislation, President Obama claimed that the conflict in Libya could not be deemed "hostilities" as that term is used in the resolution. This argument was made both in a letter to Congress during the summer of 2011 n68 and in congressional testimony given by Harold Koh, the State Department Legal Advisor under the Obama Administration. n69 [\*1209] Koh's testimony provides the most complete recitation of the Obama Administration's analysis and focuses on four factors that distinguish the fighting in Libya (or at least the United States' participation) from "hostilities": the scope of the mission, the exposure of U.S. forces, the risk of escalation, and the nature of the tactics to be used. First, "the mission is limited." n70 That is, the objectives of the overall campaign led by the North American Treaty Organization ("NATO") were confined to a "civilian protection operation ... implementing a U.N. Security Council resolution." n71 Second, the "exposure" of the U.S. forces involved was narrow - the conflict did not "involve active exchanges of fire with hostile forces" in ways that would endanger U.S. service members' safety. n72 Third, the fact that the "risk of escalation [was] limited" weighed in favor of not categorizing the conflict as "hostilities." n73 Finally, the "military means" the United States used in Libya were limited in nature. n74 The majority of missions were focused on "providing intelligence capabilities and refueling assets." n75 Those American flights that were air-to-ground missions were a mix of suppression-of-enemy-air-defenses operations to enforce a no-fly zone and strikes by armed Predator drones. n76 As a point of comparison, Koh noted that "the total number of U.S. munitions dropped has been a tiny fraction of the number dropped in Kosovo." n77 With the exception of this final factor, these considerations are quite similar to the factors that define whether a conflict is a "war" for constitutional purposes. n78 The result of this reasoning is a substantially relaxed restraint on presidential authority to use force abroad going forward. As armed drones begin [\*1210] to make up a larger portion of the United States' arsenal, n79 and as other protective technologies, such as standoff munitions n80 and electronic warfare techniques, gain traction, it is far more likely that the "exposure" of U.S. forces will decrease substantially. The force used in Yemen and the Horn of Africa is illustrative of this new paradigm where U.S. service members are not "involved [in] active exchanges of fire with hostile forces," n81 but rather machines use force by acting as human proxies. To the same point, if the "military means" used in Libya are markers of something short of "hostilities," the United States is only likely to see the use of those means increase in the coming decades. Pressing the logic of Koh's testimony, leeway for unilateral executive action will increase as the makeup of our arsenal continues to modernize. n82 Dudziak worries about the invocation of "wartime" as an argument for the perpetual exercise of extraordinary powers. The Libya scenario, of course, is somewhat different - the president has argued that the absence of "war" leaves him a residuum of power such that he may use force abroad without congressional input. The two positions are of a piece, though. Dudziak argues that legacy conceptions of "wartime" and "peacetime" have left us vulnerable to the former's use, in and of itself, as a reason for increased executive power. Such literal thinking - that "war" is something specific or that the word "hostilities" has certain limits - also opens the door to the Obama Administration's defense of its position on Libya. And looking at the substance of that position leaves much to be desired. Both Koh's testimony and the OLC memo pay lip service to the idea that the policy considerations underlying their position are consistent with the policy considerations of the Framers with respect to the Declare War Clause and Congress with respect to the War Powers Resolution. But the primary, if not the only, consideration mentioned is the loss of U.S. forces. That concern is front and center when analyzing the "exposure" of service [\*1211] members, n83 and it is also on display with respect to discussions about the nature and scope of an operation. n84 This is not the only policy consideration that one might intuit from those two provisions, however. Using lethal force abroad is a very serious matter, and the U.S. polity might rationally want input from the more representative branch in deciding when, where, and how that force is used in its name. In that same vein, permitting one individual to embroil the nation in foreign conflicts - limited or otherwise - without the input of another coequal branch of government is potentially dangerous. n85 As Dudziak's framework highlights the limits of the Obama Administration's argument for expansive power, so does the Administration's novel dissection of "hostilities" illustrate the limits of Dudziak's analysis. Dudziak presents a narrative arc bending toward the expansion of wartime and, as a result, increased presidential power. That is not the case with Libya: the president finds power in "not war" rather than in "wartime." If the American public is guilty, as Dudziak asserts, of using the outmoded and misleadingly concrete terminology of "wartime" to describe an increasingly complex phenomenon, Dudziak herself is guilty of operating within a paradigm where wartime necessarily equals more executive power (than does "not war"), a paradigm that has been supplanted by a more nuanced reality. Although [\*1212] Dudziak identifies the dangers of manipulating the boundaries of wartime, her catalog of manipulations remains incomplete because of the inherent limits of her framework. This realization does not detract from Dudziak's warnings about the perils of endless wartime, however. Indeed, the powers that President Obama has claimed seem, perhaps, more palatable after a decade in which war has been invoked as an argument for many executive powers that would, in other eras, seem extraordinary. Though he has not explicitly invoked war during the Libya crisis, President Obama has certainly shown a willingness to manipulate its definition in the service of expanded executive power in ways that seem sure to increase "war's presence as an ongoing feature of American democracy" (p. 136). Conclusion Dudziak presents a compelling argument and supports it well. War Time is potent as a rhetorical device and as a way to frame decisionmaking. This is especially so for the executive branch of the U.S. government, for which wartime has generally meant increased, and ever more expansive, power. As the United States continues to transit an era in which the lines between "war" and "peace" become increasingly blurred and violent adversaries are a constant, the temptation to claim wartime powers - to render the extraordinary ordinary - is significant. This Notice has argued that, contrary to Dudziak's concerns, the temptation is not absolute. Indeed, in some instances - notably, detention operations in Iraq and Afghanistan - we are still able to differentiate between "war" and "peace" in ways that have hard legal meaning for the actors involved. And, importantly, the executive still feels compelled to abide by these distinctions and act in accordance with the law rather than claim wartime exceptionalism. That the temptation is not absolute, however, does not mean that it is not real or that Dudziak's concerns have not manifested themselves. This detachment of expansive power from temporally bound periods has opened the door for, and in some ways incentivized, limiting wartime rather than expanding it. While President Obama has recognized the legal constraints that "war" imposes, he has also followed in the footsteps of executives who have attempted to manipulate the definition of "war" itself (and now the definition of "hostilities") in order to evade those constraints as much as possible. To the extent he has succeeded in that evasion, he has confirmed what seems to be Dudziak's greatest fear: that "military engagement no longer seems to require the support of the American people, but instead their inattention" (p. 132).

#### Restricting detention policies means we kill and extradite prisoners

Jack Goldsmith 09, a professor at Harvard Law School and a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, assistant attorney general in the Bush administration, 5/31/09, “The Shell Game on Detainees and Interrogation,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/29/AR2009052902989.html

The cat-and-mouse game does not end there. As detentions at Bagram and traditional renditions have come under increasing legal and political scrutiny, the Bush and Obama administrations have relied more on other tactics. They have secured foreign intelligence services to do all the work -- capture, incarceration and interrogation -- for all but the highest-level detainees. And they have increasingly employed targeted killings, a tactic that eliminates the need to interrogate or incarcerate terrorists but at the cost of killing or maiming suspected terrorists and innocent civilians alike without notice or due process.¶ There are at least two problems with this general approach to incapacitating terrorists. First, it is not ideal for security. Sometimes it would be more useful for the United States to capture and interrogate a terrorist (if possible) than to kill him with a Predator drone. Often the United States could get better information if it, rather than another country, detained and interrogated a terrorist suspect. Detentions at Guantanamo are more secure than detentions in Bagram or in third countries.¶ The second problem is that terrorist suspects often end up in less favorable places. Detainees in Bagram have fewer rights than prisoners at Guantanamo, and many in Middle East and South Asian prisons have fewer yet. Likewise, most detainees would rather be in one of these detention facilities than be killed by a Predator drone. We congratulate ourselves when we raise legal standards for detainees, but in many respects all we are really doing is driving the terrorist incapacitation problem out of sight, to a place where terrorist suspects are treated worse.¶ It is tempting to say that we should end this pattern and raise standards everywhere. Perhaps we should extend habeas corpus globally, eliminate targeted killing and cease cooperating with intelligence services from countries that have poor human rights records. This sentiment, however, is unrealistic. The imperative to stop the terrorists is not going away. The government will find and exploit legal loopholes to ensure it can keep up our defenses.¶ This approach to detention policy reflects a sharp disjunction between the public's view of the terrorist threat and the government's. After nearly eight years without a follow-up attack, the public (or at least an influential sliver) is growing doubtful about the threat of terrorism and skeptical about using the lower-than-normal standards of wartime justice.¶ The government, however, sees the terrorist threat every day and is under enormous pressure to keep the country safe. When one of its approaches to terrorist incapacitation becomes too costly legally or politically, it shifts to others that raise fewer legal and political problems. This doesn't increase our safety or help the terrorists. But it does make us feel better about ourselves.

The aff is too little too late - the squo is a functional NSC court

Brill 10 - Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2011; Yale University, B.A. 2007 (Sophia, http://yalelawandpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Brill\_28.pdf, The National Security Court We Already Have )

In the summer of 2007, two law professors made a splash by proposing the creation of a “national security court.” Professors Jack Goldsmith and Neal Katyal, the former having served in the Bush Administration’s Office of Legal Counsel, and the latter now serving in the Solicitor General’s Office of the Obama Administration, proposed a “Congressionally sanctioned system of preventive detention.”1 Article III judges would determine whether the government had a valid rationale for detention in each case brought before them. Congress would define who counts as an “enemy,” and it would create rules for the handling of classified evidence and other procedural details. The system would be “comprehensive.”2 Goldsmith and Katyal’s proposal garnered considerable criticism from civil libertarians, who worried that the creation of a parallel justice system was unnecessary and potentially dangerous. Of course, Congress has passed no such law, and the Obama Administration indicated last fall that it would not seek new legislation to this effect.4 Instead, the Department of Justice released a statement that, in continuing to detain individuals held at Guantánamo Bay, it would rely on “authority already provided by Congress” in the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), passed in the immediate wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks.5 While the AUMF does not mention detention specifically, the Supreme Court held in 2004 that it includes the power to detain certain types of combatants in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 6 Four years later, in Boumediene v. Bush, the Court held that all detainees in Guantánamo Bay have a constitutional right to petition for writs of habeas corpus.7 Hamdi and Boumediene have spawned an entirely new area of federal common law: the common law of preventive detention. In articulating the broad outlines of a government power (detention) and a process of review (habeas proceedings), the Supreme Court specifically gave trial courts discretion to determine the exact contours of detention authority on a case-by-case basis. Dozens of such habeas cases now have been channeled to the D.C. district court, and since the fall of 2008, the judges on that court have released a flurry of rulings accepting or rejecting detainees’ petitions. Although many civil libertarians have found comfort in the fact that a majority of these petitions were granted, they have missed the forest for the trees. The D.C. district court is performing essentially the same “national security court” task that Goldsmith and others proposed as a pipe dream for new legislation.8 That is, the district court judges are operating under a framework that allows the government to detain individuals indefinitely, without trial, and subject to review under relaxed evidentiary and procedural standards. This Comment argues that, less than two years after Boumediene, the D.C. district court’s habeas jurisprudence has, through a common law process, constructed the national security court that was so controversial as a policy proposal. This jurisprudence recently was crystallized and substantially sharpened in the first appellate ruling on post-Boumediene habeas cases: the D.C. Circuit’s Al-Bihani v. Obama decision.9 Though much has been written about the general legal problems regarding preventive detention,10 few have addressed the contours of the detention system that now exists in our courts.11 Because much of this important new policymaking has occurred through trial courts, one aim of this Comment is simply to elucidate some of the key holdings of the federal district judges, in the hope that greater transparency will facilitate more fruitful dialogue. Part I thus examines the substance of the D.C. district court’s rulings on habeas petitions and detention authority and the recent ruling issued by the D.C. Circuit in Al-Bihani. Part II discusses why civil libertarians’ apparent satisfaction with many of the rulings so far is misplaced, in that it ignores the courts’ underlying expansion of the President’s detention authority.12 Part III argues that a common law route is particularly problematic in the detention context, drawing current policy implications from the D.C. district court habeas rulings and concluding that the D.C. Circuit should have taken a far more minimalist approach in its recent Al-Bihani decision.Between the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene, which held that Guantánamo detainees are entitled to petition for writs of habeas corpus, up until the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Al-Bihani, the D.C. district court issued sixteen publicly available rulings granting or denying such petitioners’ cases on the merits, and three additional decisions setting standards as to whom the government may detain.13 These decisions contain both colorful disagreements and crucial points of convergence, and their key holdings are discussed in Section I.A below. Section I.B then discusses the D.C. Circuit’s recent Al-Bihani opinion, which crystallized and substantially sharpened some of the district court’s holdings. The common law path from the district court rulings through the recent appellate ruling shows a growing acceptance and normalization of preventive detention authority—even in cases where the courts have ordered the release of detainees. A. June 12, 2008 - January 5, 2010 The district court decisions have addressed a complex range of issues, from the definition of an “enemy combatant” and the criteria for detention to the types of evidence the government may use and the degree of deference to such evidence that will be afforded by the courts. While this Comment explores some of the points of contention in the D.C. district court opinions, it also demonstrates an important point of convergence. Namely, each judge to have decided a habeas appeal has done so within a general framework that authorizes longterm preventive detention, as long as the government can show by a preponderance of the evidence that an individual is (or was) a member of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces. Moreover, the district court judges have more or less uniformly followed a set of unique, judicially crafted procedures tailored to the habeas cases.

### Terrorism

Restricting detention policies means we kill and extradite prisoners

Jack Goldsmith 09, a professor at Harvard Law School and a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, assistant attorney general in the Bush administration, 5/31/09, “The Shell Game on Detainees and Interrogation,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/29/AR2009052902989.html

The cat-and-mouse game does not end there. As detentions at Bagram and traditional renditions have come under increasing legal and political scrutiny, the Bush and Obama administrations have relied more on other tactics. They have secured foreign intelligence services to do all the work -- capture, incarceration and interrogation -- for all but the highest-level detainees. And they have increasingly employed targeted killings, a tactic that eliminates the need to interrogate or incarcerate terrorists but at the cost of killing or maiming suspected terrorists and innocent civilians alike without notice or due process.¶ There are at least two problems with this general approach to incapacitating terrorists. First, it is not ideal for security. Sometimes it would be more useful for the United States to capture and interrogate a terrorist (if possible) than to kill him with a Predator drone. Often the United States could get better information if it, rather than another country, detained and interrogated a terrorist suspect. Detentions at Guantanamo are more secure than detentions in Bagram or in third countries.¶ The second problem is that terrorist suspects often end up in less favorable places. Detainees in Bagram have fewer rights than prisoners at Guantanamo, and many in Middle East and South Asian prisons have fewer yet. Likewise, most detainees would rather be in one of these detention facilities than be killed by a Predator drone. We congratulate ourselves when we raise legal standards for detainees, but in many respects all we are really doing is driving the terrorist incapacitation problem out of sight, to a place where terrorist suspects are treated worse.¶ It is tempting to say that we should end this pattern and raise standards everywhere. Perhaps we should extend habeas corpus globally, eliminate targeted killing and cease cooperating with intelligence services from countries that have poor human rights records. This sentiment, however, is unrealistic. The imperative to stop the terrorists is not going away. The government will find and exploit legal loopholes to ensure it can keep up our defenses.¶ This approach to detention policy reflects a sharp disjunction between the public's view of the terrorist threat and the government's. After nearly eight years without a follow-up attack, the public (or at least an influential sliver) is growing doubtful about the threat of terrorism and skeptical about using the lower-than-normal standards of wartime justice.¶ The government, however, sees the terrorist threat every day and is under enormous pressure to keep the country safe. When one of its approaches to terrorist incapacitation becomes too costly legally or politically, it shifts to others that raise fewer legal and political problems. This doesn't increase our safety or help the terrorists. But it does make us feel better about ourselves.

#### No retaliation

Ruwe 8 (Daniel, 5/27, http://danielruwe.blogspot.com/2008/05/barack-obama-gaffe-machine.html)

Another revealing Obama quote is his answer to a debate question regarding a hypothetical terrorist attack on an American city. (Remember when there was a presidential debate about every two weeks? That seems so long ago). Obama’s answer: “the first thing we’d have to do is make sure we’ve got an effective emergency response, something that this administration failed to do when we had a hurricane in New Orleans. And I think we have to review how we operate in the event of not only a natural disaster but also a terrorist attack. The second thing is to make sure that we’ve got good intelligence. . . . But what we can’t do is then alienate the world community based on faulty intelligence, based on bluster and bombast.” If that answer still is Obama’s position (Obama’s views are maddeningly hard to pin down), then he clearly has not the vaguest idea of how to respond to a terrorist attack. The emergency response required for a terrorist attack is completely different than that required for a natural disaster—for example, natural disasters are handled first by state and local governments, while terrorist attacks fall squarely into the federal government’s bailiwick. In addition, terrorist attacks are preventable. Also, Obama might want to consider retaliating against those who attacked us, a concept missing from his reply. Lack of retaliation against America’s enemies seems to be a premise of his foreign policy—if we talk to them, they won’t attack us. He seems to base his opposition to the Iraq War not so much on the strategic reasons behind it, but because he seems to think that war in general is almost always unacceptable. This quote is revealing because he rarely enunciates this idea so openly.

#### Growth causes eco-collapse and extinction – only collapse now ensures civilization can survive the inevitable transition.

Barry 8 – Glen, PhD in Land Resources from UW-Madison and President and Founder of Ecological Internet, “Economic Collapse and Global Ecology,” Counter-Currents, Jan. 14, http://www.countercurrents.org/barry140108.htm

Humanity and the Earth are faced with an enormous conundrum -- sufficient climate policies enjoy political support only in times of rapid economic growth. Yet this growth is the primary factor driving greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental ills. The growth machine has pushed the planet well beyond its ecological carrying capacity, and unless constrained, can only lead to human extinction and an end to complex life. With every economic downturn, like the one now looming in the United States, it becomes more difficult and less likely that policy sufficient to ensure global ecological sustainability will be embraced. This essay explores the possibility that from a biocentric viewpoint of needs for long-term global ecological, economic and social sustainability; it would be better for the economic collapse to come now rather than later. Economic growth is a deadly disease upon the Earth, with capitalism as its most virulent strain. Throw-away consumption and explosive population growth are made possible by using up fossil fuels and destroying ecosystems. Holiday shopping numbers are covered by media in the same breath as Arctic ice melt, ignoring their deep connection. Exponential economic growth destroys ecosystems and pushes the biosphere closer to failure. Humanity has proven itself unwilling and unable to address climate change and other environmental threats with necessary haste and ambition. Action on coal, forests, population, renewable energy and emission reductions could be taken now at net benefit to the economy. Yet, the losers -- primarily fossil fuel industries and their bought oligarchy -- successfully resist futures not dependent upon their deadly products. Perpetual economic growth, and necessary climate and other ecological policies, are fundamentally incompatible. Global ecological sustainability depends critically upon establishing a steady state economy, whereby production is right-sized to not diminish natural capital. Whole industries like coal and natural forest logging will be eliminated even as new opportunities emerge in solar energy and environmental restoration. This critical transition to both economic and ecological sustainability is simply not happening on any scale. The challenge is how to carry out necessary environmental policies even as economic growth ends and consumption plunges. The natural response is going to be liquidation of even more life-giving ecosystems, and jettisoning of climate policies, to vainly try to maintain high growth and personal consumption. We know that humanity must reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% over coming decades. How will this and other necessary climate mitigation strategies be maintained during years of economic downturns, resource wars, reasonable demands for equitable consumption, and frankly, the weather being more pleasant in some places? If efforts to reduce emissions and move to a steady state economy fail; the collapse of ecological, economic and social systems is assured. Bright greens take the continued existence of a habitable Earth with viable, sustainable populations of all species including humans as the ultimate truth and the meaning of life. Whether this is possible in a time of economic collapse is crucially dependent upon whether enough ecosystems and resources remain post collapse to allow humanity to recover and reconstitute sustainable, relocalized societies. It may be better for the Earth and humanity's future that economic collapse comes sooner rather than later, while more ecosystems and opportunities to return to nature's fold exist. Economic collapse will be deeply wrenching -- part Great Depression, part African famine. There will be starvation and civil strife, and a long period of suffering and turmoil. Many will be killed as balance returns to the Earth. Most people have forgotten how to grow food and that their identity is more than what they own. Yet there is some justice, in that those who have lived most lightly upon the land will have an easier time of it, even as those super-consumers living in massive cities finally learn where their food comes from and that ecology is the meaning of life. Economic collapse now means humanity and the Earth ultimately survive to prosper again. Human suffering -- already the norm for many, but hitting the currently materially affluent -- is inevitable given the degree to which the planet's carrying capacity has been exceeded. We are a couple decades at most away from societal strife of a much greater magnitude as the Earth's biosphere fails. Humanity can take the bitter medicine now, and recover while emerging better for it; or our total collapse can be a final, fatal death swoon. A successful revolutionary response to imminent global ecosystem collapse would focus upon bringing down the Earth's industrial economy now. As society continues to fail miserably to implement necessary changes to allow creation to continue, maybe the best strategy to achieve global ecological sustainability is economic sabotage to hasten the day. It is more fragile than it looks.

#### Collapse now key—prevents future environmental destruction and wars caused by growth

**Trainer 2**—Senior Lecturer, School of Social Work, University of New South Wales (Ted, Debating the significance of the Global Eco-village Movement; A reply to Takis Fotopoulos, Democracy & Nature: the International Journal of Inclusive Democracy, vol.8, no.1, (March 2002), http://www.democracynature.org/vol8/takis\_trainer.htm, AMiles)

It is conceivable to me that this general strategic beginning point could achieve a more or less peaceful replacement of the capitalist system. Remember that it is very likely that within 20 years capitalist-consumer society will have run into huge problems, especially to do with environmental deterioration, Third World squalor, armed conflict, deteriorating social cohesion, and above all a sudden, major and insoluble petroleum crisis. It is in other words quite possible that we will soon enter conditions that will both jolt people in general towards recognising the need for change to The Simpler Way, and dramatically undercut the system's capacity to persuade or force people to adhere to the capitalist way. Traditional Left theoreticians must realise that if this happens all will be lost if we have not by then sufficiently developed the new ways and built the examples that could be rapidly taken up. The window of opportunity will soon close.

### New Advantage

#### Drones are comparatively worse, prefer our evidence - quotes senior Bush lawyers.

Roberts 13 - Writer for the Guardian (Dan, May 2nd 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/bush-administration-lawyer-drone-strikes-being-used-as-alternative-to-guantnamo-2013-5, BUSH LAWYER: Drone Strikes Are Worse Than Indefinite Detention)

The lawyer who first drew up White House policy on lethal drone strikes has accused the Obama administration of overusing them because of its reluctance to capture prisoners that would otherwise have to be sent to Guantánamo Bay. John Bellinger, who was responsible for drafting the legal framework for targeted drone killings while working for George W Bush after 9/11, said he believed their use had increased since because President Obama was unwilling to deal with the consequences of jailing suspected al-Qaida members. "This government has decided that instead of detaining members of al-Qaida [at Guantánamo] they are going to kill them," he told a conference at the Bipartisan Policy Center. Obama this week pledged to renew efforts to shut down the jail but has previously struggled to overcome congressional opposition, in part due to US disagreements over how to handle suspected terrorists and insurgents captured abroad. An estimated 4,700 people have now been killed by some 300 US drone attacks in four countries, and the question of the programme's status under international and domestic law remains highly controversial. Bellinger, a former legal adviser to the State Department and the National Security Council, insisted that the current administration was justified under international law in pursuing its targeted killing strategy in countries such as Pakistan and Yemen because the US remained at war. "We are about the only country in the world that thinks we are in a conflict with al-Qaida, but countries under attack are the ones that get to decide whether they are at war or not," he said. "These drone strikes are causing us great damage in the world, but on the other hand if you are the president and you do nothing to stop another 9/11 then you also have a problem." Nevertheless, the legal justification for drone strikes has become so stretched that critics fear it could now encourage other countries to claim they were acting within international law if they deployed similar technology. A senior lawyer now advising Barack Obama on the use of drone strikes conceded that the administration's definition of legality could even apply in the hypothetical case of an al-Qaida drone attack against military targets on US soil. Philip Zelikow, a member of the White House Intelligence Advisory Board, said the government was relying on two arguments to justify its drone policy under international law: that the US remained in a state of war with al-Qaida and its affiliates, or that those individuals targeted in countries such as Pakistan were planning imminent attacks against US interests. When asked by the Guardian whether such arguments would apply in reverse in the unlikely event that al-Qaida deployed drone technology against military targets in the US, Zelikow accepted they would. "Yes. But it would be an act of war, and they would suffer the consequences," he said during the debate at the Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington. Hina Shamsi, a director at the American Civil Liberties Union, warned that the issue of legal reciprocity was not just a hypothetical concern: "The use of this technology is spreading and we have to think about what we would say if other countries used drones for targeted killing programmes." "Few thing are more likely to undermine our legitimacy than the perception that we are not abiding by the rule of law or are indifferent to civilian casualties," she added. Zelikow, a former diplomat who also works as a professor of history at the University of Virginia, said he believed the US was in a stronger position when it focused on using drones only against those directly in the process of planning or carrying out attacks. "Bush badly mangled the definition of enemy combatant to expand to anyone who might be giving support, which was very pernicious," he said. Zelikow – stressing he was speaking in a personal capacity, not on behalf of the administration – added that he felt the US should be clearer in explaining that its targeted killing programme was responding to specific threats against national security.

#### They don't solve - Boumedian for their Knowles ev is in context of transparency and accountability for trials, reason military comissions aka: the aff are bad.

#### Can’t solve the legitimacy IL – Knowles concludes habeas rights are a necessary pre-req

#### Plan will be perceived as replicating Guantanamo – it shreds US credibility and undermines allied cooperation

**Colson, 9** - Acting Director, Law & Security Program at Human Rights First (Deborah, “The Case Against A Special Terrorism Court” March)

Proposals for a special terrorism court should be rejected 􀂄 A special terrorism court is unnecessary and impractical: Among the many lessons learned from the misguided Guantánamo episode are the practical difficulties of trying to create new, ad hoc justice systems. Just like the military commissions at Guantánamo, a new court inevitably would be bogged down in litigation and delay. 􀂄 Our procedural safeguards and evidentiary standards comprise the bedrock of American justice: A new court would undermine the integrity of the justice system and perpetuate the damage to America’s reputation for fairness and transparency done by unjust military commissions and prolonged detention without charge at Guantánamo. 􀂄 Special courts and detention without trial undermine U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Creating a state-side replica of the Guantánamo legal regime would impair counterterrorism cooperation with our allies and fuel terrorist recruitment.

#### Turns the whole case

**Schulhofer, 9** – professor of law at New York University (Stephen, “Unraveling Guantánamo: Detention, Trials and the "Global War" Paradigm” 3/5, New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers. Paper 117. http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu\_plltwp/117)

A national security court, apart from its practical difficulties and inevitable start-up glitches, will plant the seeds of fundamental, long-lasting damage to the national well-being. We have never had a “comprehensive system of preventive detention,” and such a system, once instituted, will be difficult to contain. The problem is not just that its legal boundaries are almost certain to creep outward over time. More fundamentally, a permanent new detention regime and a permanent national security court will entrench a psychology of permanent danger, with the paradox of permanent need for emergency powers. To be sure, judicial oversight of any sort will be an improvement over the unchecked presidential power the Bush administration so nearly succeeded in amassing. But to establish a special court with “national security” detention powers unavoidably legitimates a concept of judicial oversight with vastly diminished transparency and accountability. The long-term effect on America’s political culture, in particular our conception of liberty and limited government, is unpredictable but, to say the least, unimaginably risky. This is not a move to make in the absence of clearly demonstrated necessity.

No spillover — lack of credibility in one commitment doesn’t affect others at all

Paul K. MacDonald 11, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Spring 2011, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 7-44

Second, pessimists overstate the extent to which a policy of retrenchment can damage a great power's capabilities or prestige. Gilpin, in particular, assumes that a great power's commitments are on equal footing and interdependent. In practice, however, great powers make commitments of varying degrees that are functionally independent of one another. Concession in one area need not be seen as influencing a commitment in another area.25 Far from being perceived as interdependent, great power commitments are often seen as being rivalrous, so that abandoning commitments in one area may actually bolster the strength of a commitment in another area. During the Korean War, for instance, President Harry Truman's administration explicitly backed away from total victory on the peninsula to strengthen deterrence in Europe.26 Retreat in an area of lesser importance freed up resources and signaled a strong commitment to an area of greater significance.

Credibility theory is incoherent — empirically denied

Jonathan Mercer 8/28, 2013, associate professor of political science at the University of Washington in Seattle and a Fellow at the Center for International Studies at the London School of Economics. Bad Reputation, 28 August 2013, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139376/jonathan-mercer/bad-reputation

Even if Assad were so simpleminded, the administration’s critics are wrong to suggest that the president should have acted sooner to protect U.S. credibility. After the red line was first crossed, Obama could have taken the United States to war to prevent Assad from concluding that an irresolute Obama would not respond to any further attacks -- a perception on Syria’s part that seems to have now made a U.S. military response all but certain. But going to war to prevent a possible misperception that might later cause a war is, to paraphrase Bismarck, like committing suicide out of fear that others might later wrongly think one is dead.¶ It is also possible that the United States did not factor into Assad’s calculations. A few months before the United States invaded Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s primary concerns were avoiding a Shia rebellion and deterring Iran. Shortsighted, yes, but also a good reminder that although the United States is at the center of the universe for Americans, it is not for everyone else. Assad has a regime to protect and he will commit any crime to win the war. Finally, it is possible that Assad never doubted Obama’s resolve -- he just expects that he can survive any American response. After all, if overthrowing Assad were easy, it would already have been done.

No impact — allies won’t abandon us and adversaries can’t exploit it

Stephen M. Walt 11, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, December 5, 2011, “Does the U.S. still need to reassure its allies?,” online: http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/05/us\_credibility\_is\_not\_our\_problem

A perennial preoccupation of U.S. diplomacy has been the perceived need to reassure allies of our reliability. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. leaders worried that any loss of credibility might cause dominoes to fall, lead key allies to "bandwagon" with the Soviet Union, or result in some form of "Finlandization." Such concerns justified fighting so-called "credibility wars" (including Vietnam), where the main concern was not the direct stakes of the contest but rather the need to retain a reputation for resolve and capability. Similar fears also led the United States to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe, as a supposed counter to Soviet missiles targeted against our NATO allies.¶ The possibility that key allies would abandon us was almost always exaggerated, but U.S. leaders remain overly sensitive to the possibility. So Vice President Joe Biden has been out on the road this past week, telling various U.S. allies that "the United States isn't going anywhere." (He wasn't suggesting we're stuck in a rut, of course, but saying that the imminent withdrawal from Iraq doesn't mean a retreat to isolationism or anything like that.)¶ There's nothing really wrong with offering up this sort of comforting rhetoric, but I've never really understood why U.S. leaders were so worried about the credibility of our commitments to others. For starters, given our remarkably secure geopolitical position, whether U.S. pledges are credible is first and foremost a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help. We should therefore take our allies' occasional hints about realignment or neutrality with some skepticism; they have every incentive to try to make us worry about it, but in most cases little incentive to actually do it.

### 2NC

### Case

Aff's court still doesn't get close to addressing the root issues plaguing our detention policy and our legitimacy.

Vladeck 9 - Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law (Stephen I., http://willamette.edu/wucl/resources/journals/review/pdf/Volume%2045/WLR45-3\_Vladeck.pdf, THE CASE AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS, 3/31/2009,506 WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW [45:505)

Moreover, regardless of how the current cases are decided, such proposals must resolve four additional issues: (1) The nature and authority of the presiding judges; (2) the substantive criteria identifying the class of individuals subject to detention; (3) the procedure by which the initial decision is made; and (4) the mechanisms for review, both at the time of the initial decision and in the months and years thereafter. Frustratingly, most of the proposals get this far, but go into very little additional detail, focusing instead on repetitive arguments for why the traditional models are inadequate. One of the more principled proposals is that offered by Katyal and Goldsmith, who argue that the decision-makers should be life-tenured Article III judges, selected by the Chief Justice in the same way as the judges on various specialized Article III courts (including, as an important related example, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Court of Review).31 Although Katyal and Goldsmith believe that “traditional” procedural and evidentiary rules should be relaxed, they nevertheless trumpet that: The court would have a permanent staff of elite defense lawyers with special security clearances as part of its permanent staff. Defense lawyers trained in the nuances of taking apart interrogation statements, particularly translated statements, are crucial because often the legal proceedings will involve little else in the way of evidence.32 They also argue for meaningful appellate review from the initial decision, for review of whether there is “a continuing rationale to detain people years after their initial cases were heard,”33 and, importantly, for the collapsing of any distinction between citizens and non-citizens.34 Missing from their proposal, though, are two critical points: The burden of proof, and, more basically, the substantive criteria for detention—the definition of who can be held, if the evidence so provides, and, as importantly, who must be released. Thus, even while arguing that courts should continually review whether there is a “continuing rationale” for detention, Katyal and Goldsmith decline to offer what such a rationale might be. And these are hardly trifling details. To the contrary, these questions go to the heart of the problem: Just who would such a regime apply to, and under how much (and what) evidence? Without these details, it is difficult—if not impossible—to truly assess the extent to which such a proposal is even a departure from prevailing norms, let alone a departure that is warranted. Other proposals suffer from similar defects. Thus, in the American Enterprise Institute white paper prepared by Andrew McCarthy and Alykhan Velshi,35 perhaps the most detailed and widely circulated proposal to date, the authors propose a national security court for both detention decisions and criminal prosecutions (more on the latter below); the proposal for the former focuses on who the judges should be and where they should sit.36 In terms of substance, McCarthy and Velshi propose that the court merely entertain appeals from the currently established CSRTs at Guantánamo Bay,37 a function already assigned to the D.C. Circuit under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA)38 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).39 Additionally, given the current legal uncertainty surrounding just what the D.C. Circuit is entitled to consider in its review of the CSRTs (or what criteria the D.C. district court should apply in habeas cases), it is hardly clear from McCarthy and Velshi’s proposal what substantive criteria the new court should follow in such cases, or what evidentiary burden it should impose. All McCarthy and Velshi seem to be advocating for is a change in forum from the D.C. federal courts to the hybridized—and secret—national security court. If there is to be a regime of preventive detention for at least some terrorism suspects, it is inevitable that such detention will be subject to at least some judicial review in some forum, especially after Boumediene. Thus, the questions these proposals have skirted go more to the underlying legality of the detention ab initio, rather than the appropriate forum in which that question should be answered.

US support for Israel demolishes our credibility---it comparatively outweighs the gains made by the plan

Hroub 11—Prof of Modern Middle Eastern Politics and Identity, Cambridge. PhD (Khaled, US fumbles Arab Spring gains over Palestine's UN bid, 11/3/11, http://www.grc.ae/?frm\_action=view\_newsletter\_web&sec\_code=grcanalysis&frm\_module=contents&show\_web\_list\_link=1&int\_content\_id=76208)

In a quick and angry response to UNESCO's decision to admit Palestine as a full member, the US administration stopped its $60 million annual contribution to the organisation's budget. Almost immediately, a flurry of condemnations of the American reaction erupted in the pan-Arab media. Once the news was broadcast, hundreds of frustrated viewers posted angry comments on Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya websites, both based in the Gulf and considered to be the leading news websites in Arabic. Particularly since the UNESCO step is more symbolic than anything else, the US reaction is seen to be way out of proportion.

General Arab frustration at the blindly pro-Israeli policies of the US has become compounded especially after Washington's (over)reaction to the Palestinian call for full statehood status at the UN in September. At that time, American pressure on the Palestinian leadership to withdraw their application ranged across the whole spectrum and continued to the very last minute. Not only were threats made including cutting annual aid to the Palestinian Authority, but President Barack Obama was reported to have held the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas personally responsible for any drop of American blood that might be shed in connection with the American veto against the Palestinian request. Some lawmakers in the US Congress have already started drafting measures to punish the Palestinians by effecting financial cuts. It could be said that the strong overall American reaction across the political spectrum in Washington has taken a harder line against the Palestinian petition than that taken in Tel Aviv.

Palestinian and other Arab commentators criticise the Americans for becoming plus royaliste que le roi, pointing to the many voices inside Israel that have been calling upon the government not only to accept the Palestinian move, but to support it. When the Palestinians started seriously considering this strategy over the past year, a prominent group of Israeli intellectuals and politicians, many of them holding prestigious Israeli awards, issued a statement, in April, in support of the declaration of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. This new Palestinian strategy of pursuing higher diplomatic status at the UN is bound within international law and creates no contradiction with any of the previous UN resolutions. In fact it is a harmless step which conforms to the parameters of the long-conducted peace process which has made the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 boundaries its ultimate goal.

The short-sighted American reaction to Palestine's UN bid can only be understood as a means of appeasing the strong Jewish-American lobbies in light of the coming elections. Such electioneering tactics, in blockheadedly showing imagined support for Israel against the almost universal support to legitimate Palestinian rights acknowledged by the US itself, will cost the Americans a high and unwarranted price. Israel is not under any existential threat that could justify the hysterical American reaction. Neither is the US even in full consensual agreement with the hard line populist politics of Israel's current government. There has recently been a need for even more rational and balanced American positioning vis-a-vis the Palestinian effort rather than the head-to-head clashes in the context of which Obama's speech at the UN will be noted in history as the most Zionist speech delivered by an American president ever.

But what is really new about all this when American policies have always sided with Israel in good times and bad? Well, actually, there are two new developments that would render an American continuation of old policies in this respect more damaging than before: the recent Arab revolutions along with what the US has invested in supporting them; and the more assertive Gulf positions supporting the Palestinians.

By adopting such a blindly over-blown line of support to the current right-wing Israeli government, the US is simply losing all the gains that it might have garnered from the Arab Spring. Starting with revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt back in January, Washington faced the dilemma of either moving along with the rising sentiment in the Arab street which would change pro-Western regimes, or support their ailing and corrupt governments. The carefully calculated positions and neatly worded statements that Washington made in response to the speedy success of these revolutions had been meant to keep a balanced stance: to side with the wave of change, but to keep other allies in the Arab region assured of American support. In the end, the official American position was read by their allies in the region as tilting towards these revolutions even if they led to the toppling of the old regimes. At the level of Arab public perception, the American stance in ditching the Tunisian and Egyptian presidents had shaken the long-lived and deep-seated anti-American sentiment in the region. One could argue that for the first time in the past two decades parts of Arab public opinion were nudged out of their strong black anti-American feeling into a decidedly lighter 'grey' area.

This move from a black and white perception of the US to a 'grey' area in a span of a mere few months should have been considered a massive strategic achievement. All previous efforts over the past decade and longer, and investments in 'Public Diplomacy' and other fruitless projects, had yielded very little. Winning the 'hearts and minds' of the Arabs required real change in politics, and many Arabs had started to see the beginning of such a change in the Arab Spring. This beginning seemed to have redressed for a while the frustration and loss of hope in President Obama, especially after the high expectations he managed to raise in his Istanbul and Cairo speeches in April and June 2009, respectively.

Yet, all efforts that the US has made, or the little achievements that it has been gaining on the Arab/Muslim public opinion front, have been continuously whittled away because of the way it has dealt with the Palestine/Israel issue. The credibility that Obama had projected in the first year of his presidency, which rapidly changed much of the negative image of the US among Arabs and Muslims, would later fail because of the stubborn Israeli position on settlements. As a condition set by the international community and by the US itself in the Roadmap for Peace, Obama pressed the Israelis to freeze building settlements prior to the resumption of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. The Israelis rejected his demand and have continued right up to the very present to construct new settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Obama did nothing, or, being unable to do anything, lost his face and credibility in the Arab and Muslim world, one may even add humiliatingly! A common metaphor that was frequently used in the Arab press depicted the US bowing on its knees before Israel.

The other new and noticeable development which would further expose America's pro-Israel policies is the new foreign policy of the Gulf countries, individually or as a GCC bloc. The Arab Spring has given the GCC an unprecedented role in leading collective Arab action, in Libya, Yemen and Syria. Egypt, Iraq and Syria, the countries that until recently would claim Arab leadership or enjoyed great influence on other Arab countries, have all taken the back seat each for obvious reasons. Within the framework of the Arab League or even outside it, the GCC bloc seems to remain, and perhaps despite many internal shortcomings, the only coherent Arab bloc that is able to function collectively and show leadership. On the Palestine front, this has been exhibited in the challenging remarks made by the Saudi prince Turki Al-Faisal in the American press, stating boldly that his country will support the Palestinian UN move without reservation. It was the concrete GCC support for the Palestinian president at the UN, according to many accounts, which had strengthened his position. There is some serious talk within the GCC that it (along with Turkey) should step in if the American threats of cutting the annual half a billion dollar or so support to the Palestinian Authority were to materialise. However, Washington is fully aware that a cut in aid would mean a cut in leverage, thus such an extreme measure would actually be very unlikely.

In the moving sands of the post-revolutions Arab region, the usual American policies towards the Israeli/Palestinian conflict have become out of date. What Washington attempts to build and invest with certain policies is destroyed and divested by other policies. Unless a radical change and a major shift in Washington's policies on Palestine is pursued, winning the hearts and minds of the Arabs seems likely to be a futile exercise - as the old Arab proverb most accurately describes, the Americans pointlessly 'are ploughing the sea'!

### K

Gulli 13. Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” <http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence>, pg. 5

I think that we have now an understanding of what the situation is: The sovereign everywhere, be it the political or financial elite, fakes the legitimacy on which its power and authority supposedly rest. In truth, they rest on violence and terror, or the threat thereof. This is an obvious and essential aspect of the singularity of the present crisis. In this sense, the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by the lack of hegemony. This is true in general, but it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, the United States, whose hegemony has diminished or vanished. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard. Lacking hegemony, the sheer drive for domination has to show its true face, its raw violence. The usual, traditional ideological justifications for dominance (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become very weak because of the contempt that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) regularly show toward legality, morality, and humanity. Of course, the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a clear limit, a possibility. Not so for the dominant nations: who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in the Gaza Strip, or envious France from once again trying its luck in Africa? Yet, though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their structural, ontological and historical, weakness. All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) only heighten the brutality in the exertion of what remains of their dominance. Although they rely on a highly sophisticated military machine (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has traditionally been and increasingly is an outpost for military operations and global policing (now excellently incarnated by Africom), they know that they have lost their hegemony. ‘Domination without hegemony’ is a phrase that Giovanni Arrighi uses in his study of the long twentieth century and his lineages of the twenty-first century (1994/2010 and 2007). Originating with Ranajit Guha (1992), the phrase captures the singularity of the global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty, in Arrighi’s “historical investigation of the present and of the future” (1994/2010: 221). It acquires particular meaning in the light of Arrighi’s notion of the bifurcation of financial and military power. Without getting into the question, treated by Arrighi, of the rise of China and East Asia, what I want to note is that for Arrighi, early in the twenty-first century, and certainly with the ill-advised and catastrophic war against Iraq, “the US belle époque came to an end and US world hegemony entered what in all likelihood is its terminal crisis.” He continues: Although the United States remains by far the world’s most powerful state, its relationship to the rest of the world is now best described as one of ‘domination without hegemony’ (1994/2010: 384). What can the US do next? Not much, short of brutal dominance. In the last few years, we have seen president Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden. While that action was most likely unlawful, too (Noam Chomsky has often noted that bin Laden was a suspect, not someone charged with or found guilty of a crime), it is certain that you can kill all the bin Ladens of the world without gaining back a bit of hegemony. In fact, this killing, just like G. W. Bush’s war against Iraq, makes one think of a Mafia-style regolamento di conti more than any other thing. Barack Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of 16-year-old Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, whose fate many have correctly compared to that of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin (killed in Florida by a self-appointed security watchman), but it is precisely in cases like this one that the weakness at the heart of empire, the ill-concealed and uncontrolled fury for the loss of hegemony, becomes visible. The frenzy denies the possibility of power as care, which is what should replace hegemony, let alone domination. Nor am I sure I share Arrighi’s optimistic view about the possible rise of a new hegemonic center of power in East Asia and China: probably that would only be a shift in the axis of uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit, the paradigm of sovereignty and violence. What is needed is rather a radical alternative in which power as domination, with or without hegemony, is replaced by power as care – in other words, a poetic rather than military and financial shift.

 b.) aff assumes violence is the long term sollution to terrorism, thats doomed to fail. They automaticly assume that so called terrosits refuse to negotiate, did you forget that it was the US that refused to negotiate with the Taliban after 9/11? Our politics of vulnerability allow for the creation of dialogic timeplaces.

Braxi 5 - \* Professor of Law, University of Warwick; Vice Chancellor, Delhi University (1990-1994); University of South Gujarat, Surat (1982-1985) (Upendra, The War on Terror and the War of Terror: Nomadic Multitudes, Aggressive Incumbents, and the New International Law - Prefactory Remarks on Two Wars, Volume 43, Number 1 Volume 43, Number 1/2 (Spring/Summer 2005) Third World Approaches to International Law After 9/11)

A new global ethno-nationalism, if one may so name this happening, is now in the making; it proclaims some inherent virtues of solidary global public citizenship, extending beyond bounds the celebrated notion of "constitutional patriotism" adumbrated by Jurgen Habermas.62 Because each one of us may be enmeshed in serial performances of mass political violence, each one of us also stands imperatively encased/interpellated within the logics, paralogics, and languages of "war on terror." These cultivate notions of public virtue in terms of a binary ethic (either you are for or against terrorism) and its associated regimes of the emerging positive global morality that seek to disarticulate any recourse to critical morality in relation to the war on terror, in all its fierce and mighty pursuit. Any ethical ambivalence stands condemned thus as complicitous with "terror." This new global ethic in the making extravagantly forfeits and squanders all potential for non-violent pursuit of the creation of dialogic timeplaces, disarticulating alternate versions of international comity as a global public good. V. THE DESTRUCTION OF COMITY Comity among nations is, indeed, a grudging virtue.63 Certain forms of inter-state courtesy and good will, while not furnishing a source of authoritative legal obligations, were, in the eye of recent history, a Eurocentric virtue practised by "civilized" nations of the West in their dealings inter se. It, of course, did not extend to their dealings with the rest of the world. Its origins are notoriously multiplex and multiple; they may be traced both to the era of European chivalry and the moral histories of the feudal virtue of honour that so brutally, if unevenly, combined forms and practices of interactions between colonizers and the colonized.64 The development of comity was, however, a "whites-only" kind of virtue in international relations. The "savage," the "barbarian," the "heathen," and the "unenlightened" masses of peoples and their political organization were placed outside the zones of comity, if only with a view to promote their capabilities for "civilization" and eventual induction into the family of nations.6 ' Even so, beneficial access to the practice of comity by all co-equal sovereign states and peoples now remains the foundation of a post-Westphalian order; this is now exposed to severe interrogation, especially by the United States. Overall, comity performed certain useful tasks, establishing a modicum of civility among nations, even in the post-Westphalian order marked first by decolonization and now by current economic-globalization. In particular, practising comity meant many orders of civility that informed magisterial evolution of the law of armed conflicts. For example, classical international law developed the practice of this virtue by requiring that the intention to go to war be notified by a declaration of war; undeclared hostilities or warfare were disfavoured. Customary international law stood informed by comity considerations when it prescribed that the use of force-even in situations of self-defence, reprisal, or retorsion-must be both reasonable and proportionate. Comity also did much silent work in the historical fashioning of the norms and standards of international humanitarian law, governing treatment of prisoners of war, the sick and wounded, and non-combatants caught in the vicious web of armed conflict. The conduct of comity was also grounded in prudential considerations. If the minimal ethical cooperation, even amidst armed conflicts, was to become a sovereign norm, winning wars remained morally worthy only if belligerent conduct retained a modicum of regard for the dignity and decency that strove to minimize "unnecessary" human suffering, even when "unnecessary" was interpellated within shifting grounds and doctrines of military necessity. Further, the idea that war should be a matter of last recourse was not altogether uninformed by the ethic of comity; after all, war remained conceived of as a necessary contribution to some steady states of peaceful cooperation among nations. The ongoing war on terror now almost totally erodes this institutionalized ethic of comity in international relations. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan, for example, rather remarkably reasserted the genre of classical comity norms when it insisted that the United States follow the old, and classical, norms of comity in international law and relations that rendered aggression a matter of last recourse. Following the classical comity patterns, the regime asked for prima facie evidence that suggested its complicity with Osama bin Laden; it assured that upon its production and verification, it would do its governmental best to locate him and his nefarious/multifarious associates; it then insisted that it would deliver them to any Islamic nation for a public international criminal trial for the commission of "crimes against humanity." None of these inherently dialogic requests were heeded by the United States in the "light" of a pre-determination to "discipline and punish" the Taliban. No international due process obligations, informed by the yesteryear virtue of comity, were thus owed to a regime once installed by the very same superpower that observed these norms of comity rather seriously in its earlier dealings with it. Fostered and deployed, once upon a time, as a "progressive" force that led to an astonishing defeat of the Soviet Empire, and co-opting, as is by now well known, Osama bin Laden, and his cohorts, as allies in the Tom Clancy-like power plays between the then two global superpowers, this regime is now presented as the post-Cold War threat to a new Cold War solitary superpower. Osama, a one-time darling of American foreign policy and secret service establishment, became its mortal enemy when he attacked the might of the American empire. The American foreign-policy hawks insisted that the Taliban regime was simply unworthy of any expedient enactments of revised editions of international trustworthiness. It had forfeited that trust because it "harboured" Osama and his cohorts, who planned and executed the attack on the Twin Towers in New York and on the Pentagon. It did not matter that this "harbouring" occurred under the auspices of some Northern states. We know from fragmentary but still not unpersuasive accounts that many a "terrorist" found a safe haven in countries of Europe and even the United States. We now know that many European states were complicit, whether through invigilatory inadvertence of the circulation of "terrorist" personnel and resources, lax immigration laws (as for example in Belgium), or safe money laundering havens provided through the Swiss banking system and other dispersed tax havens in the First World. The notion of "harbouring" thus remains heavily Euroamerican-centric in the current ongoing "war on terrorism., 66 The conveniently indeterminate notion of harbouring also continues to preside over the discovery or the invention of new "enemies" as expediently elaborated by the global hegemon and its nomadic war machine, an articulation which also include whole civilian populaces (I write this in the devastating moment of Falluja) somehow suspected of harbouring "terrorists." These remain exposed to means and methods of search and destroy operations that altogether disregard the classical canons of temeperamenta belli restraints. The unproved degrees of complicity of the South states do not contemporaneously matter; it remains altogether politically incorrect even to raise the question of the Euroamerican harbouring and facilitation of the growth of "terrorist" networks before, and in the run-up, of 9/11 violence. All that matters for the "war on terror" are the ultimately contrived (as some conspiracy theorists would have us believe) "intelligence-failed" reports concerning the nomadic, fugitive presence of Osama bin Laden somewhere in Afghanistan, and his suspected cohorts just about anywhere in the world. Sheer suspicion remains good enough for the extraordinary, Star Wars type, military exertions directed to the total devastation of almost everything in sight that remotely approximates the "terrorist" presence and habitat. Did not, after all, Osama claim authorship of the violent events of 9/11 from somewhere in Afghanistan? This mere suspicion proved "good enough" for a threshold, and even abiding, distrust of the Taliban regime, despite its claims to capacity to deliver him to "justice." The regime, in any event, had to be mightily liquidated forever in the hope that the process would somehow yield Osama, alive or dead.67 In a sense, the inaugural act of the unfolding "war on terror" marks the beginning of the anachronistic revival, in this halcyon moment of hyper-globalization, of the medieval wars of revenge and retaliation, where considerations of comity among nations remain altogether ethically illegible. Thus begins the first chapter of the narrative of the twenty first century enactment of a new medievalism. Let us, for a moment, indulge in a counterfactual. Imagine a zodiac in which the comity considerations prevailed, in which the dialogical demands of the Taliban regime were subjected to a system of international cooperation and verification, and in which an international regime would have backed the Taliban "good faith" assertions of the efforts to track down the "terrorists."68 Assume further that working with the Taliban constituted an estate of very limited trust, one in which specific deadlines for the accomplishment of the mission were thus set, failures being visited by the likes of the notoriously named Operation Infinite and Operation Enduring Freedom. Assume further that any accompanying success would have left open for negotiation the Taliban demand of delivery of Osama and his cohorts to a more "friendly" Islamic state, or even a "neutral" non-Islamic state, wholly amenable to the developing jurisprudence of international criminal law. After all, even Libya had agreed to a trial in Scotland for the Lockerbie disaster. Would such an exercise in renovated comity have left the world an assuredly worse place compared, of course, with yet another Afghan War that so disastrously took place? "What-if' questions are notorious for posing and answering, but it remains the sovereign function of comity ethic to foreground these. Much the same, as future historians may vouchsafe for us, may be said concerning Saddam Hussein; scarcely a redemptive human figuration, and yet one for so long bolstered by the very same western powers and leaders who even proceeded to condemn Israel's unilateral bombing of an alleged nuclear reactor in Iraq as an unconscionable act of force. The Security Council discourse at that moment displayed a solicitous regard for unprovoked violation of the sovereignty of the Iraqi State. The Security Council held that the mere Israeli suspicion that a nuclear power plant may eventually be used to destroy the state of Israel did not furnish any justification for a swift foul swoop that destroyed the installation. The logic was that state entities, under international law, may not justifiably deploy force under the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence without overwhelming evidence of existence of a hostile intent, actual verification of the existence of weapons of mass destruction, and the ability to deploy these as a means and an end for a brutal assertion of power. All this scarcely furnished any ground for circumspection in the eventual unilateralist invasion of Iraq by the coalition of the willing states in 2003, even despite discord among some Permanent Members of the Security Council who insisted that a reasoned latitude of time be accorded to Iraq to comply with various foundational resolutions urging compliance with the destruction of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq's submissions to the contrary notwithstanding, the United States and the United Kingdom were, on all available evidence hitherto, determined to the rather ferocious "disarmament war" against it. And the postconflict "justifications" for this enormous use of force, and its rather devastating impact, remain untroubled by the global social fact that its own commissions of enquiry at the highest level now altogether establish that Iraq did not, after all, possess a semblance of evidence for the construction and deployment of any orders of mass destruction weaponry. The new normativity unleashed by the phrase-regimes of Operation Infinite and Operation Enduring Freedom now furnishes the wherewithal of a new "liberal" political theology (as Carl Schmitt named this69), summated by the "war on terror," which, in turn, installs the exception as the rule; where the jurisdiction of suspicion emerges as the foundational ground ofjurisdiction of armed installation ofglobalpublic truths in ways that bid an unwholesome adieu to earlier normativity of comity among nation-states. The new comity stands defined in terms of arrogance of the power of the solitary global hegemon. What remains decisive is not any truth of the matter but the matter of truth, that is, the truths of political propaganda that fatefully unleash acts and performances of the war on "terror." Given this, it is unsurprising that "terrorist" groups and actors feel further empowered to plead an order of justification for the awesome violence of the causes and missions that they espouse.

### A2: Thayer

Thayer is flat wrong and reads his ideas onto science, not the other way around—replicates domination and makes oppression inevitable. The science supports only the alternative.

Busser, 2006

(Mark, Masters of Political Science @ York University, *YCISS Working Paper Number 40*, August 2006, “The Evolution of Security: Revisiting the Human Nature Debate in International Relations,” http://pi.library.yorku.ca/dspace/handle/10315/1323)

**Responding directly to Thayer**, Duncan Bell and Paul MacDonald have expressed concern at **the intellectual functionalism inherent in sociobiological explanations**, suggesting that **too often analysts choose a specific behaviour and read backwards into evolutionary epochs in an attempt to rationalize explanations for that behaviour. These arguments**, Bell and MacDonald write, often **fall into** what Richard Lewontin and Stephen Jay Gould have called **‘adaptionism,’ or “the attempt to understand all physiological and behavioural traits of an organism as evolutionary adaptations.”**42 **Arguments such as these are hand-crafted by their makers, and tend to carry forward their assumptions and biases.** In an insightful article, Jason Edwards suggests that **sociobiology and its successor, evolutionary psychology, are fundamentally political because they frame their major questions in terms of an assumed individualism.** Edwards suggests that the main question in both sub- fields is: “given human nature, how is politics possible?”**43 The problem is that the ‘givens’ of human nature are drawn backward from common knowledges and truths about humans in society, and the game-theory experiments which seek to prove them are often created with such assumptions in mind.** These arguments are seen by their critics as politicized from the very start. **Sociobiology in particular has been widely interpreted as a conservative politico-scientific tool because of these basic assumptions, and because of the political writings of many sociobiologists**.44 **Because sociobiology naturalizes certain behaviours like conflict, inequality and prejudice,** Lewontin *et al*. suggest that **it “sets the stage for legitimation of things as they are.”**45 **The danger inherent in arguments that incorporate sociobiological arguments into examinations of modern political life**, the authors say**, is that such arguments naturalize variable behaviours and support discriminatory political structures. Even if certain behaviours are found to have a biological drives behind them, dismissing those behaviours as ‘natural’ precludes the possibility that human actors can make choices and can avoid anti-social, violent, or undesirable action.**46 **While the attempt to discover a genetically- determined human nature has usually been justified under the argument that knowing humankind’s basic genetic programming will help to solve the resulting social problems, discourse about human nature seems to generate self-fulfilling prophesies by putting limits on what is considered politically possible. While sociobiologists tend to distance themselves from the naturalistic fallacy that ‘what is’ is ‘what should be,’ there is still a problem with employing adaptionism to ‘explain’ how existing political structures because conclusions tend to be drawn in terms of conclusions that assert what ‘must be’ because of biologically- ingrained constraints**.47 **Too firm a focus on sociobiological arguments about ‘natural laws’ draws attention away from humanity’s potential for social and political solutions that can counteract and mediate any inherent biological impulses, whatever they may be. A revived classical realism based on biological arguments casts biology as destiny in a manner that parallels the neo-realist sentiment that the international sphere is doomed to everlasting anarchy.** Jim George quotes the English School scholar Martin Wight as writing that “hope is not a political virtue: it is a theological virtue.”48 George questions the practical result of traditional realsist claims, arguing that **the suggestion that fallen man’s sinful state can only be redeemed by a higher power puts limitations on what is considered politically possible. Thayer’s argument rejects the religious version of the fallen man for a scientific version, but similar problems remain with his ‘scientific’ conclusions. The political and philosophical debates that surround sociobiology in general are the least of the problems with Bradley Thayer’s article.** In fact, **Thayer’s argument is exactly the sort of reading of sociobiology about which its critics** like Lewontin and Gould **have been uncomfortably anticipating. Worse, Thayer’s exercise demonstrates a misreading of many evolutionary arguments drawing conclusions with which the theorists he cites would likely distance themselves. His argument about an egoistic human nature relies on a tiresomely common oversimplification of “a classic Darwinist argument,” crudely linking natural selection to the assumption that selfishness encourages evolutionary fitness**; Even Thayer feels the need to qualify this argument in a footnote.49 **Thayer’s citation of Richard Dawkins’ selfish gene theory to provide “the second sufficient explanation for egoism” is also incredibly problematic.**50 **In *The Selfish Gene,* Dawkins suggests that at the beginning of micro-organic life genes that promoted survival were key to making basic life-forms into simple ‘survival machines.’** Rather than viewing genes as an organism’s tool for generating, **Dawkins suggests that it is wiser to look at the development of complex organisms as genes’ method of replicating themselves. The word *selfish* is used as a shorthand to describe a more complex phenomenon: genes that give their organic vessel advantages in survival and reproduction are successfully transmitted into future generations**.5 1 **However, an important part of Dawkins’ work is that the ‘selfishness’ of genes translates into decidedly *unselfish* behaviours. Dawkins himself has had to distance himself from groups who interpreted his focus on kin selection as a reification of ethnocentrism**: The National Front was saying something like this, “kin selection provides the basis for favoring your own race as distinct from other races, as a kind of generalization of favoring your own close family as opposed to other individuals.” Kin selection doesn’t do that! Kin selection favors nepotism towards your own immediate close family. It does not favor a generalization of nepotism towards millions of other people who happen to be the same color as you.52 **In light of a careful consideration of the intricacies of Dawkin’s thinking, Thayer’s treatment of his theories seems remarkably crude and shallow. Broad conclusions seem to materialize as if from thin air: “In general,” Thayer writes, “the selfishness of the gene increases its fitness, and so the behaviour spreads.”**53 **This line, crucial to Thayer’s point, is such a brazen oversimplification and misinterpretation of Dawkin’s work that Thayer’s arguments about a provable natural human egoism are rendered essentially baseless in terms of scientific evidence.** **Thayer’s argument about the ubiquity of hierarchical structures of power rely on a dichotomous hypothetical choice between eternal conflict and structures of dominance.** The suggestion that the ubiquity of male- dominated hierarchies ‘contributes to fitness’ in the present tense comes dangerously close to naturalizing and reifying patriarchal structures of human social organization.54 **As presented, the argument reads very much like Hobbes’ *Leviathan,* in which pre-social actors sought the refuge and protection of a larger social order. In many ways, Thayer seems to be reconstructing the Leviathan using sociobiology rather clumsily to justify broad generalizations. It is certain that some mix of biology and culture have led to male-dominated cultures in the past, and there is a strong basis for the argument that humans have developed a need to belong to social groups. It is also clear that humans have the mental capacity to understand and technologies for operating within dominance hierarchies. Yet these possibilities together do not suggest, contrary to Thayer’s argument, that “humans readily give allegiance to the state, or embrace religion or ideologies such as liberalism or communism, because evolution has produced a need to belong to a dominance hierarchy.”**55 **If humans do depend on social connectedness, must this necessarily come in the form of hierarchical, patriarchal structures? The case is not made convincingly**. As I shall discuss below**, alternate understandings of the connection between basic human needs, human culture, and environmental stresses can provide an understanding of dominance hierarchies that does not naturalize their ubiquity.** **Beyond the problems with the scientific evidence behind Thayer’s ontological claims, there are also problems with his proposed epistemological project of consilience. Using sociobiology to unite the social and natural sciences** (and to give bases to a revitalized classical realism) **would depend on achieving a near omnipotence, where known genetic programs could be weighed against known environmental influence, using science to predict the results.** At the outset of his essay, **Thayer implies that science is progressing at a rapid pace towards making this a reality. Yet evolutionary explanations for specific behaviours become incredibly problematic given all of the possible factors and externalities which might have affected evolutionary outcomes, all of which are impossible to map into even the most complex mathematical theoretical games.** Bell and MacDonald point out that **many biologists dispute whether sociobiology can offer useful commentary on humans “because of the central role of culture, language, and self-reflexivity in determining human behaviour.”**56 Similarly, in response to Shaw and Wong, Joshua Goldstein cites evidence that **human beings do not demonstrate an inherent tendency towards aggression, instead displaying cooperation more often.** Goldstein offers the possibility that **human behavioural traits like aggression, altruism, and sacrifice are shaped more by cultural transmission than by genes. This possibility enormously complicates the attempt at consilience intended by Thayer and his contemporaries, by adding in incalculable variables that come with social and cultural interactions.**57 Because of these complications, Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin have asserted that **sociobiology’s grand argument is discredited since no aspect of human social behaviour has ever been linked to a specific gene or set of genes.**58 As Mary Clark observes, **one of the major results of the human genome project was the falsification of the supposition that each protein produced in a human cell was coded by a separate gene. In fact, genes often work interdependently, with the same gene recurring along the chromosome and causing different outcomes depending on its position and neighbouring genes.** Clark describes the complex signals and activations which occur at the genetic level, concluding that rather than a linear unidirectional blueprint, the human genome is more like an ecosystem, and can be responsive to its microscopic – and perhaps even the macroscopic – environment.59 Just how important are the influences culture, social behaviour, and environment to the human condition, as distinct from biological programming? **In many caveats and footnotes within Thayer’s own argument, he includes statements that acknowledge the importance of cultural factors in the shaping of modern human societies. If all behaviour cannot be explained by sociobiology and other evolutionary arguments because behaviours are contingent on cultural and environmental factors, how strong is the scientific support for Thayer’s revived realist project?** As Bell and MacDonald have suggested, **many of the scientific foundations Thayer employs to support his epistemological program are indeterminate because they cannot explain when cultural or environmental factors will play a role.**60 On the ontological side, **Thayer certainly comes a long way from proving that human nature is defined by and limited to egoism and dominance, as he had intended to do. If knowledge borrowed from evolutionary biology and other natural sciences suggests that culture and environment play a significant role in shaping human behaviours, then it may not be the realist project that is best supported by a deep and sustained interdisciplinary exploration. Citing evolutionary Science does not truly support ‘realist’ narratives and explanations of egoistic competition in human society, despite the fact that over the years it has often been cited by those wishing to make such cases. There is plenty of evidence in evolutionary science for explaining why biology is not destiny, and in fact, for unsettling any claim about an evolutionarily-derived ‘human nature’ that underlies political life.** In her book *In Search of Human Nature*, Mary E. Clark has suggested that instead of a human nature defined by genetically programmed instincts, predispositions and drives, it is more useful to discuss a human nature in terms of universal needs. These needs, she argues, are as close to a ‘human nature’ as we humans have, since their fulfilment is necessary as a result of complex development. Clark suggests that human beings have basic biological and psychological needs for *bonding*, for *autonomy*, and for *meaning*.

#### Pacifism is a better strategy.

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 100-102)

It would be foolish to claim that nonviolent action always succeeds against any opponent, just as it would be foolish to claim that ¶ violence always succeeds against any enemy. We must look to the evidence of history. It should be clear that the widespread belief that ¶ nonviolence “doesn’t work” is a misconception grounded in ignorance ¶ or neglect of when and where nonviolent direct action has succeeded. ¶ Similarly, the widespread confidence in violent means of struggle ¶ rests on neglect of its many failures. A review of post– World War II ¶ military interventions is beyond the scope of this book, but we can ¶ take a broad look at the historical record by reflecting briefly on important military actions of the past few decades. Vietnam, Lebanon, ¶ Somalia, Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq all come to mind. ¶ How well has violence “worked”? Did the outcome of the war in Vietnam outweigh the evils in death, injuries, destruction, dislocation, ¶ and influence of the war on the region, namely, Pol Pot’s reign of terror? The Vietnam war is widely considered a tragic mistake. What ¶ about the first and second wars in Iraq? When the full outcome is ¶ weighed, will justice be served by such thorough destruction of a nation’s infrastructure, deaths and injuries of tens (some say hundreds) ¶ of thousands, dislocation of millions of refugees, and a very uncertain future for the region? Beyond Vietnam and Iraq, can we honestly say ¶ that the outcomes of war are better for Lebanon, Somalia, Chechnya, ¶ and Bosnia, not to mention the prospects for the ongoing war in Afghanistan? It seems not. In every case the intentions and expectations ¶ widely missed the outcomes. So, history shows that nonviolence has ¶ succeeded with little preparation and virtually no public confidence ¶ while violence is systematically planned, of the highest priority when ¶ investing public resources, and widely supported, yet it frequently ¶ fails to be an effective means of achieving the peaceful ends desired. ¶ Critics say pacifists should “be realistic.” Pacifists ask the same of warists, and history— certainly since the end of World War II— seems to ¶ favor nonviolence. Pragmatic objections to pacifism, once examined, ¶ are not decisive refutations at all. It must be acknowledged that pacifism may or may not succeed at ¶ defeating unrestrained evil. At the same time we must admit that war, ¶ by its nature, is a test of might; as such, it can never settle questions of ¶ right.18 Rather, in war one side prevails and domination replaces the ¶ cooperation of genuine peace. And it is exactly at this point that the ¶ positive peace side of pacifism makes its strongest case: only nonviolence can create the internal order characteristic of genuine peace, so ¶ violence always fails in the long run. Violence can satisfy the urge to do ¶ something in the face of injustice, violence can satisfy the desire for ¶ revenge against evil, and sometimes violence can impose a short-term ¶ negative peace. But violence cannot create and sustain the conditions ¶ of genuine positive peace because these conditions come from within ¶ individuals and groups by agreement and cooperation, not from the ¶ outside by force or threat. The historical record of the last century— ¶ the carnage of the twentieth century which began with most victims ¶ of war being combatants and ended with most victims of war being ¶ innocent civilians— should awaken us to the need for fundamental ¶ change, as should successes of largely nonviolent revolution in much of ¶ Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the nonviolent dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, and in the unarmed ¶ forces of the Philippines removing a dictator through nonviolent revolution. We are a sorry species if the best we can do is multiply and refine our means of violence while escalating our military threats and ¶ actions, carrying out increasingly devastating violence against one an-¶ other. But history shows not only the failure of violence but also the successes of nonviolence; here we find hope that we may learn from ¶ the past and reduce violence while expanding nonviolence.

#### War is a social condition that can be untaught through counter-hegemonic praxis.

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 23-24)

The slow but persistent rise in awareness of racial, ethnic, gender, sexual- orientation, and class oppression in our time and the beginning efforts of liberation from within oppressed groups offer hope that even the most deeply held and least explicitly challenged predispositions of culture might be examined. Such examinations can lead to changes in the lives of the oppressed. Perhaps even those oppressed by warism will one day free themselves from accepting war as an inevitable condition of nature. Two hundred years ago slavery was a common and well- established social institution in the United States. It had been an ordinary feature of many societies dating to ancient and perhaps prehistoric times. Slavery was taken for granted as a natural condition for beings thought to be inferior to members of the dominant group. And slavery was considered an essential feature of our nation’s economy. Within the past two centuries, attitudes toward slavery have changed dramatically. With these fundamental shifts in normative lenses came fundamental shifts in the practice and legality of slavery. These changes have been as difficult as they have been dramatic, for former slaves, for former slave- holders, and for culture at large. While deep racial prejudices persist to this day, slavery is no longer tolerated in modern societies. Slavery- like conditions of severe economic exploitation of labor have become embarrassments to dominant groups in part because slavery is universally condemned. The point is that the most central values of cultures— thought to be essential to the very survival of the society and allegedly grounded in the natural conditions of creation—can change in fundamental ways in relatively short periods of time with profound implications for individuals and societies. John Dewey beautifully links this point to the consideration of warism: “War is as much a social pattern [for us] as was the domestic slavery which the ancients thought to be immutable fact.”9 The civil rights movement has helped us see that human worth is not determined by a racial hierarchy. Feminism has helped us realize again that dominant attitudes about people are more likely values we choose rather than innate and determined features of human nature. It is historically true that men have been more actively violent and have received more training and encouragement in violence than have women.10 Dominant attitudes of culture have explained this by reference to what is “natural” for males and “natural” for females. By questioning the traditional role models for men and women, all of us be- come more free to choose and create the selves we are to be; we need not be defined by hidden presumptions of gender roles. Parallel to racial and gender liberation movements, pacifism questions taking warism for granted. Pacifists seek an examination of our unquestioned assumption of warism to expose it as racism and sexism have been examined and exposed. Just as opponents of racism and sex- ism consider the oppression of nonwhites and women, respectively, to be wrong, and thus to require fundamental changes in society, so opponents of warism— pacifists of various sorts— consider war to be wrong, and thus to require fundamental changes in society.

### 1nr

### AT No Transition

#### Growth mindset is fragile – collapse solves.

**Speth 8 –** Rhodes Scholar @ Oxford University, Chairman of Council on Environmental Quality for Executive Office, Founder of World Recourses Institute (Think-Tank), Led the Western Hemisphere Dialogue on Environment and Development, Administrator of United Nations Development Program, Dean of Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Leader of the President’s Task Force on Global Recourses and the Environment, Holds multiple awards—National Wildlife Federation’s Recourse Defense Award and Lifetime Achievement Award of Environmental Law Institute, and Blue Planet Prize, James, “The Bridge at the Edge of the World”, p 121-3

A ray of hope comes from Robert Collins in his book More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America. Collins points out how “the pursuit of economic growth came to become a central and defining feature of U.S. public policy in the half-century after the end of World War II. Commentators in the 1950s coined the term ‘growthmanship’ to describe the seemingly single-minded pursuit of exuberant economic growth that was then appearing to dominate the political agenda and the public dialogue throughout the Western industrialized world, no- where more dramatically than in that bastion of materialistic excess, the United States. . . . “What made the postwar pursuit of growth distinctively modern was the availability of new state powers and means of macroeconomic management dedicated to achieving growth that was more exuberant, more continuous and constant, more aggregately quantiﬁable, and also more precisely measured than ever before. Perhaps we can best ap- preciate what made postwar growthmanship distinctive by looking at the context from which it emerged, for it was the ambivalence of New Deal economic policy that made the subsequent emergence of growthmanship seem like a striking departure.”” If our current growthmania is indeed an artifact of the postwar world, then there is hope that it is not a permanent or inevitable feature of the economic landscape. But Collins is realistic about the scale of the challenge. He observes that “the acceptance of limits in the pursuit of growth brings its own painful consequences. Growth has often been America’s ‘out’—the way, many believed, that the nation could somehow square the circle and reconcile its love of liberty with its egalitarian pretensions. Without the promise of particularly rapid growth to resolve this tension at the core of the American enterprise, we are at century’s end left with a task fully challenging enough to test, and perhaps again to tap, whatever reserves of national genius and greatness we carry with us into the new millennium.”““ The good news is that there are ways other than rapid growth to “resolve this tension," as the chapter that follows shows. If challenging growth seems difficult, one should remember Milton Friedman’s observation: “Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable. That is one philosophy—be ready for the coming crisis. Another, taken from Mahatma Ghandi, is more active: “First they laugh at you” he said, “then they ignore you, then they fight you, then you win”.

#### Mindset shift is possible.

Victor 10 - Peter Victor is an economist at York University in Toronto, Ontario and author of Managing Without Growth: Slower by Design, Not Disaster, Questioning economic growth, Nature 468, 370–371 (18 November 2010)

The idea that governments of developed countries should no longer pursue economic growth as a primary policy objective is widely regarded as heresy. Yet a growing number of scholars, policy-makers and citizens are coming round to the idea that the planet cannot sustain continued global economic growth. Even economist Robert Solow, who won the 1987 Nobel Prize in Economics for his work on economic growth, said in 2008 that the United States and Europe might soon find that “either continued growth will be too destructive to the environment and they are too dependent on scarce natural resources, or that they would rather use increasing productivity in the form of leisure”1. The idea of steady-state economies, or even economic 'degrowth', in developed countries is gaining traction. The reasons for disenchantment with economic growth as a paramount policy objective are not hard to find. Humanity has gone beyond the 'safe operating space' of the planet with respect to climate change, nitrogen loadings and biodiversity loss, and threatens to do so with six other major global environmental issues2. This excessive burden on Earth can be traced to the massive increase in the materials, fossil fuels and biomass used by the world's economies. Mankind's 'throughput' — the sheer weight of materials, including fuel, that feed the world's economies — has increased 800% in the twentieth century3, with a correspondingly large increase in wastes returned to the environment. In the same time, the human population has risen from 1.6 billion to more than 6 billion, and our presence has been felt over an increasingly large part of Earth's surface. All of this drove and was driven by unprecedented economic growth, the benefits and costs of which have been spread remarkably unevenly around the planet. A key question now is whether and how economies can develop in a way that respects Earth's biophysical boundaries and feeds the 9 billion people expected by mid-century. One option is for developed countries to continue striving for economic growth, while attempting to reduce impacts on the planet. This means betting that economic growth can be successfully and rapidly decoupled from material and energy inputs. Such 'green growth' is currently favoured by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). But it can be confounded by the rebound effect: efficiency improvements often induce changes that reduce, nullify or outweigh environmental and resource benefits. This was first recognized in 1865 by economist W. S. Jevons, who noted that improvements in steam engines were accompanied by an increase in total coal consumption. By 1910, the best steam engines in the United Kingdom were about 36 times more efficient than those of 1760 (ref.4), but a 2,000-fold rise in steam-power use5 had increased coal consumption dramatically. A rebound of 50% is not unusual for many technologies. What price happiness? An alternative is to encourage growth in sectors of the economy that use fewer resources, such as the service sector. Such a strategy could buy some time, but not if it simply shifts the production of resource-intensive products and their related environmental burdens to other countries, as has been the pattern in recent years. A third option is to limit growth itself. The battle against climate change illustrates the attractiveness of this strategy. To reduce greenhouse-gas emissions (GHG) by 80% over 50 years, an economy that increases its real gross domestic product (GDP) by 3%a year must reduce its emissions intensity — tonnes of GHG per unit of GDP — by an astonishing 6% a year. For an economy that does not grow, the annual cut would be a still very challenging 3.2%. The view that we should curb planetary impacts by reducing growth in richer countries is reinforced by several considerations. First, there is mounting evidence that this growth is largely unrelated to measures of happiness. Second, in recent decades, increasing inequality has accompanied much of this growth, leading to problems ranging from poor public health to social unrest. Third, the prospects for real improvement in the developing world are likely to be diminished if developed countries continue to encroach on more ecological space. Removing economic growth as a major policy priority runs counter to the views of governments and many international agencies. Many nations responded to the recent financial crisis with desperate measures to resume economic growth. Yet when we recognize how briefly economic growth has held such prominence in policy circles, dethroning it seems less improbable. Regular estimates of GDP by governments date back only to the 1940s, and the measure was initially used in support of specific objectives, such as stimulating employment. Only in the 1950s did economic growth become a policy priority in its own right6.

###  AT Elites

#### Even the elites will change their minds after the global economic system collapses.

**Kasiola, 03** – Dean of the College of Behavioral and Social Sciences at San Francisco State University (Joel Jay, "Questions to Ponder in Understanding the Modern Predicament," Explorations in Environmental Political Theory: Thinking About What We Value, edited by Joel Jay Kassiola, Published by M.E. Sharpe, p.186-187)

The unhappy experience and knowledge of increasing environmental degradation with threats to all planetary life should move **the industrial rich** to recognize the self-defeating and unsatisfactory nature of modern values and social practices. They **may** come to **accept** the **necessity of a new,** postmodern **social order,** one **not** so **characterized by** the ideologies of capitalism, **industrialism**, and Hobbesianism. **In this new order citizens**—including the rich—**can have more leisure time** to experience and contemplate the nonmaterial and more fulfilling aspects of the human condition, like nature. Nature’s value to humans, as Goodin tells us, lies in directing humans to something “outside themselves,” something “larger than themselves,” that “locates the self.”16 Of course, extensive social learning will have to occur if such a radical change is to occur, but it is precisely such a type of change that is needed to realize sustainability and justice. The crucial role of such social learning to societal transformation is emphasized by both Milbrath’s and Pirages’s contributions. An urgent question remains: What specific agent can transform modern society to an environmentally consistent, moral, and satisfying social order? Several contributors note the role of disappointment, or tragedy (in Oscar Wilde’s sense of “emptiness after success”) on the recognition of mistaken goals. We experience alienation as we work harder and longer “getting and spending” yet increase our anguish and dissatisfaction with life. Some of our authors have remarked about the Wildean tragedy, or irony, of the most materially successful society in world history having success be its downfall. However, just as Zimmerman admonishes us to preserve what is positive about modernity (for example, freedom from the shackles of feudalism and increased productivity to meet human biological needs), I feel compelled to remind the reader of Paehlke’s discussion of globalization, especially as it pertains to the global industrial elites and the effective spread of their ideology of growthmania and endless consumption. These elites control the global mass media of communications and direct the expanding reach of increasingly large and powerful transnational corporations. The dynamics of how the current hegemonic rule of the industrial corporate behemoths will be undermined has yet to be written, posing a significant challenge to all environmental political theorists, environmental researchers and activists (similar to Zimmerman’s unforeseen “caterpillar [end page 186] into a butterfly” transformation analogy). As Paehlke fears, we merely may be moving forward between cars on a train as it moves backward without changing its direction! But **even the** **most destination-minded** train engineer **will** stop, **change direction**, and reassess her/his stated objective **when they run out of fuel, see disastrous circumstances ahead, and realize the** train’s projected **destination does not exist!**

### AT Sustainability

Market can’t solve

Homer-Dixon 91 - CIGI Chair of Global Systems at the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Canada, On The Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict, http://www.librarsy.utoronto.ca/pcs/thresh/thresh3.htm

Historically, cornucopians have been right to criticize the idea that resource scarcity places fixed limits on human activity. Time and time again, human beings have circumvented scarcities, and neo-Malthusians have often been justly accused of "crying wolf." But in assuming that this experience pertains to the future, **cornucopians overlook** seven **factors**. First, whereas **serious scarcities of critical resources in the past** usually **appeared singly, now we face multiple** scarcities **that** **exhibit** powerful **interactive**, feedback, and threshold **effects**. An agricultural region may, for example, be simultaneously affected by degraded water and soil, greenhouse-induced precipitation changes, and increased ultraviolet radiation. This makes the future highly uncertain for policymakers and economic actors; tomorrow will be full of extreme events and surprises. Furthermore, as numerous resources become scarce simultaneously, it will be harder to identify substitution possibilities that produce the same end-use services at costs that prevailed when scarcity was less severe. Second, **in the past** the **scarcity** of a given resource usually **increased slowly, allowing time for** social, economic, and technological **adjustment. But** human populations are much larger and **activities** of individuals **are**, on a global average, **much more resource-intensive** than before. This means that debilitating **scarcities** often **develop** much **more quickly**: whole countries may be deforested in a few decades; most of a region's topsoil can disappear in a generation; and critical ozone depletion may occur in as little as twenty years. Third, today's **consumption has far greater momentum** than in the past, because of the size of the consuming population, the sheer quantity of material consumed by this population, and the density of its interwoven fabric of consumption activities. The countless **individual and corporate** economic **actors** making up human society **are heavily** **committed to certain patterns of resource use;** and the **ability** of our markets **to adapt may be sharply** **constrained** by these entrenched interests. These first three factors may soon combine to produce a daunting syndrome of environmentally induced scarcity: humankind will face multiple resource shortages that are interacting and unpredictable, that grow to crisis proportions rapidly, and that will be hard to address because of powerful commitments to certain consumption patterns. The fourth reason that cornucopian arguments may not apply in the future is that the free-market **price** mechanism **is a bad gauge of scarcity**, especially **for resources held in common, such as** a benign climate and **productive seas**. In the past, many such resources seemed endlessly abundant; now they are being degraded and depleted, and we are learning that their increased scarcity often has tremendous bearing on a society's well-being. Yet this scarcity is at best reflected only indirectly in market prices. In addition, people often cannot participate in market transactions in which they have an interest, either because they lack the resources or because they are distant from the transaction process in time or space; in these cases the true scarcity of the resource is not reflected by its price. The fifth reason is an extension of a point made earlier: market-driven adaptation to resource scarcity is most likely to succeed in wealthy societies, where abundant reserves of capital, knowledge, and talent help economic actors invent new technologies, identify conservation possibilities, and make the transition to new production and consumption patterns. Yet **many** of the **societies** **facing the most serious environmental problems** in the coming decades **will be poor;** even if they have efficient markets, **lack of capital and know-how will hinder their response** to these problems. Sixth, cornucopians have an anachronistic faith in humankind's ability to unravel and manage the myriad processes of nature. There is no a priori reason to expect that human scientific and technical ingenuity can always surmount all types of scarcity. **Human beings may not have the mental capacity to understand adequately the complexities of environmental-social systems.** Or it may simply be impossible, given the physical, biological, and social laws governing these systems, to reduce all scarcity or repair all environmental damage. Moreover, the chaotic nature of these systems may keep us from fully anticipating the consequences of various adaptation and intervention strategies.76 Perhaps most important, scientific and **technical knowledge** must be built incrementally--layer upon layer--and its **diffusion** to the broader society often **takes decades. Any** technical **solutions** to environmental scarcity **may arrive too late** to prevent catastrophe. Seventh and finally, **future environmental problems**, rather than inspiring the wave of ingenuity predicted by cornucopians, **may instead reduce the supply of ingenuity available in a society**. The **success of market mechanisms depends on an intricate and stable system** of institutions, social relations, and shared understandings (the ideational factors in Figure 1). Cornucopians often overlook the role of social ingenuity in producing the complex legal and economic climate in which technical ingenuity can flourish. Policymakers must be clever "social engineers" to design and implement effective market mechanisms.77 Unfortunately, however, the syndrome of multiple, interacting, unpredictable, and rapidly changing environmental problems will increase the complexity and pressure of the policymaking setting. It will also generate increased "social friction" as elites and interest groups struggle to protect their prerogatives. The ability of policymakers to be good social engineers is likely to go down, not up, as these stresses increase.

#### Growth unsustainable, collapse k2 solve extinction

Homer-Dixon ‘11

[Thomas Homer-Dixon, CIGI chair of global systems at the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Canada, “ECONOMIES CAN'T JUST KEEP ON GROWING”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/unconventional_wisdom?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>]

Humanity has made great strides over the past 2,000 years, and we often assume that our path, notwithstanding a few bumps along the way, goes ever upward. But we are wrong: Within this century, environmental and resource constraints will likely bring global economic growth to a halt. Limits on available resources already restrict economic activity in many sectors, though their impact usually goes unacknowledged. Take rare-earth elements -- minerals and oxides essential to the manufacture of many technologies. When China recently stopped exporting them, sudden shortages threatened to crimp a wide range of industries. Most commentators believed that the supply crunch would ease once new (or mothballed) rare-earth mines are opened. But such optimism overlooks a fundamental physical reality. As the best bodies of ore are exhausted, miners move on to less concentrated deposits in more difficult natural circumstances. These mines cause more pollution and require more energy. In other words, opening new rare-earth mines outside China will result in staggering environmental impact. Or consider petroleum, which provides about 40 percent of the world's commercial energy and more than 95 percent of its transportation energy. Oil companies generally have to work harder to get each new barrel of oil. The amount of energy they receive for each unit of energy they invest in drilling has dropped from 100 to 1 in Texas in the 1930s to about 15 to 1 in the continental United States today. The oil sands in Alberta, Canada, yield a return of only 4 to 1. Coal and natural gas still have high energy yields. So, as oil becomes harder to get in coming decades, these energy sources will become increasingly vital to the global economy. But they're fossil fuels, and burning them generates climate-changing carbon dioxide.If the World Bank's projected rates for global economic growth hold steady, global output will have risen almost tenfold by 2100, to more than $600 trillion in today's dollars. So even if countries make dramatic reductions in carbon emissions per dollar of GDP, global carbon dioxide emissions will triple from today's level to more than 90 billion metric tons a year. Scientists tell us that tripling carbon emissions would cause such extreme heat waves, droughts, and storms that farmers would likely find they couldn't produce the food needed for the world's projected population of 9 billion people. Indeed, the economic damage caused by such climate change would probably, by itself, halt growth. Humankind is in a box. For the 2.7 billion people now living on less than $2 a day, economic growth is essential to satisfying the most basic requirements of human dignity. And in much wealthier societies, people need growth to pay off their debts, support liberty, and maintain civil peace. To produce and sustain this growth, they must expend vast amounts of energy. Yet our best energy source -- fossil fuel -- is the main thing contributing to climate change, and climate change, if unchecked, will halt growth. We can't live with growth, and we can't live without it. This contradiction is humankind's biggest challenge this century, but as long as conventional wisdom holds that growth can continue forever, it's a challenge we can't possibly address**.**

#### Their authors biased and wrong

**Trainer 7**—Senior Lecturer in School of Social Work @ University of New South Wales [Ted, “Renewable Energy Cannot Sustain A Capitalist Society”, ebsco]

There is an overwhelmingly powerful, never questioned, assumption that all these problems can and will be solved by moving to renewable energy sources. That is, it is generally believed that sources such as the sun and the wind can replace fossil fuels, providing the quantities of energy that consumer society will need, in the forms and at the times that they are needed. Surprisingly, almost no literature has explored whether this is possible. Unfortunately in the task of assessing the validity of this dominant assumption we have not been helped by the people who know most about the field, the renewable energy experts. They have a strong interest in boosting the potential of their pet technology and in not drawing attention to its weaknesses, difficulties and limits. Exaggerated, misleading, questionable and demonstrably false claims are often encountered in the promotional literature. Minor technical advances which might or might not become significant in the long run are announced as miraculous solutions. Doubts regarding the potential of renewable technologies are rarely if ever heard from within these fields. This enthusiasm is understandable in view of the need to attract public support and research funding, but it means that contributions by those most familiar with these fields to the critical assessment of the potential and limits of renewables are quite rare. In developing the following review, considerable difficulty has been encountered from people hostile to having attention drawn to the weaknesses in their technologies and proposals (including threats of legal action if data they have provided in personal communications is used). Sources eager to provide information tend to dry up when they realize that limits are being explored. In addition some of the crucial information will not be made public by the private firms developing the new systems. For example it is almost impossible to get information on actual windmill output in relation to mean wind speeds at generating sites.

#### Dedev!!!!!!!

**Jamail 12/17/13**—writer for The Nation, internally cites a whole slew of qualified climate experts including renowned wizard James Hansen

(Dahr, “The Coming ‘Instant Planetary Emergency’”, http://www.thenation.com/article/177614/coming-instant-planetary-emergency#, dml)

Climate-change-related deaths are already estimated at 5 million annually, and the process seems to be accelerating more rapidly than most climate models have suggested. Even without taking into account the release of frozen methane in the Arctic, some scientists are already painting a truly bleak picture of the human future. Take Canadian Wildlife Service biologist Neil Dawe, who in August told a reporter that he wouldn’t be surprised if the generation after him witnessed the extinction of humanity. All around the estuary near his office on Vancouver Island, he has been witnessing the unraveling of “the web of life,” and “it’s happening very quickly.”¶ “Economic growth is the biggest destroyer of the ecology,” Dawe says. “Those people who think you can have a growing economy and a healthy environment are wrong. If we don’t reduce our numbers, nature will do it for us.” And he isn’t hopeful humans will be able to save themselves. “Everything is worse and we’re still doing the same things. Because ecosystems are so resilient, they don’t exact immediate punishment on the stupid.”¶ The University of Arizona’s Guy McPherson has similar fears. “We will have very few humans on the planet because of lack of habitat,” he says. Of recent studies showing the toll temperature increases will take on that habitat, he adds, “They are only looking at CO2 in the atmosphere.”¶ Here’s the question: Could some version of extinction or near-extinction overcome humanity, thanks to climate change—and possibly incredibly fast? Similar things have happened in the past. Fifty-five million years ago, a five-degree Celsius rise in average global temperatures seems to have occurred in just thirteen years, according to a study published in the October 2013 issue of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. A report in the August 2013 issue of Science revealed that in the near-term Earth’s climate will change ten times faster than at any other moment in the last 65 million years.¶ “The Arctic is warming faster than anywhere else on the planet,” climate scientist James Hansen has said. “There are potential irreversible effects of melting the Arctic sea ice. If it begins to allow the Arctic Ocean to warm up, and warm the ocean floor, then we’ll begin to release methane hydrates. And if we let that happen, that is a potential tipping point that we don’t want to happen. If we burn all the fossil fuels then we certainly will cause the methane hydrates, eventually, to come out and cause several degrees more warming, and it’s not clear that civilization could survive that extreme climate change.”¶ Yet, long before humanity has burned all fossil fuel reserves on the planet, massive amounts of methane will be released. While the human body is potentially capable of handling a six-to-nine-degree Celsius rise in the planetary temperature, the crops and habitat we use for food production are not. As McPherson put it, “If we see a 3.5 to 4C baseline increase, I see no way to have habitat. We are at .85C above baseline and we’ve already triggered all these self-reinforcing feedback loops.”¶ He adds: “All the evidence points to a locked-in 3.5 to 5 degree C global temperature rise above the 1850 ‘norm’ by mid-century, possibly much sooner. This guarantees a positive feedback, already underway, leading to 4.5 to 6 or more degrees above ‘norm’ and that is a level lethal to life. This is partly due to the fact that humans have to eat and plants can’t adapt fast enough to make that possible for the 7-to-9 billion of us—so we’ll die.”¶ If you think McPherson’s comment about lack of adaptability goes over the edge, consider that the rate of evolution trails the rate of climate change by a factor of 10,000, according to a paper in the August 2013 issue of Ecology Letters. Furthermore, David Wasdel, director of the Apollo-Gaia Project and an expert on multiple feedback dynamics, says, “We are experiencing change 200 to 300 times faster than any of the previous major extinction events.”¶ Wasdel cites with particular alarm scientific reports showing that the oceans have already lost 40 percent of their phytoplankton, the base of the global oceanic food chain, because of climate-change-induced acidification and atmospheric temperature variations. (According to the Center for Ocean Solutions: “The oceans have absorbed almost one-half of human-released CO2 emissions since the Industrial Revolution. Although this has moderated the effect of greenhouse gas emissions, it is chemically altering marine ecosystems 100 times more rapidly than it has changed in at least the last 650,000 years.”)¶ “This is already a mass extinction event,” Wasdel adds. “The question is, how far is it going to go? How serious does it become? If we are not able to stop the rate of increase of temperature itself, and get that back under control, then a high temperature event, perhaps another five to six degrees [C], would obliterate at least 60 percent to 80 percent of the populations and species of life on Earth.”¶ What Comes Next?¶ In November 2012, even Jim Yong Kim, president of the World Bank Group (an international financial institution that provides loans to developing countries), warned that “a 4C warmer world can, and must be, avoided. Lack of action on climate change threatens to make the world our children inherit a completely different world than we are living in today.”¶ A World Bank–commissioned report warned that we are indeed on track to a “4C world” marked by extreme heat waves and life-threatening sea-level rise.¶ The three living diplomats who have led UN climate change talks claim there is little chance the next climate treaty, if it is ever approved, will prevent the world from overheating. “There is nothing that can be agreed in 2015 that would be consistent with the two degrees,” says Yvo de Boer, who was executive secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2009, when attempts to reach a deal at a summit in Copenhagen crumbled. “The only way that a 2015 agreement can achieve a two-degree goal is to shut down the whole global economy.”¶ Atmospheric and marine scientist Ira Leifer is particularly concerned about the changing rainfall patterns a recently leaked IPCC draft report suggested for our future: “When I look at what the models predicted for a 4C world, I see very little rain over vast swaths of populations. If Spain becomes like Algeria, where do all the Spaniards get the water to survive? We have parts of the world which have high populations which have high rainfall and crops that exist there, and when that rainfall and those crops go away and the country starts looking more like some of North Africa, what keeps the people alive?”¶ The IPCC report suggests that we can expect a generalized shifting of global rain patterns further north, robbing areas that now get plentiful rain of future water supplies. History shows us that when food supplies collapse, wars begin, while famine and disease spread. All of these things, scientists now fear, could happen on an unprecedented scale, especially given the interconnected nature of the global economy.

### 2nr

#### No Indo-Pak conflict- energy cooperation and new governance

Sam Tranum 6/25/13, MA from the University of Chicago in IR and a journalist covering energy and politics in South Asia, 6/25/13, "India-Pakistan Energy Cooperation Could Get Boost Under Sharif," World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13049/india-pakistan-energy-cooperation-could-get-boost-under-sharif

Pakistani and Indian officials met earlier this month to discuss cross-border energy cooperation, perhaps signaling that the new government in Islamabad aims to follow through on plans its predecessor spent years talking about. That would be good for both countries. ¶ Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) party swept Pakistan's parliamentary election in May, and Sharif took over as prime minister early this month, pledging—among other things—to improve relations with India and address his country's crippling energy shortage. ¶ On June 11, the prime minister’s younger brother, Shahbaz Sharif, the head of government in Pakistan's largest province, Punjab, reportedly met officials from India's Ministry of Power and Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. They talked about Pakistan importing electricity and natural gas from India. ¶ The meeting in itself is not unprecedented. During its five years in power, the previous government in Islamabad under the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) talked to Indian government officials and companies about importing gasoline, diesel, natural gas and electricity. India seemed willing to help Pakistan then, but nothing happened.¶ There are still factions on both sides of the border that oppose normalizing relations and will try to block efforts by Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to work together on energy and other issues. But as the energy crisis in Pakistan grows increasingly acute, the pressure might overwhelm such opposition. ¶ Among the proposals on the table is a cross-border electricity transmission line with the capacity to transfer 500-1,000 megawatts of power from India to Pakistan. India is short of power and suffers regular planned and unplanned power cuts. But Pakistan is much worse off. ¶ In the fiscal year that ended March 31, the two-thirds of Indians with access to electricity faced an 8.7 percent supply-demand gap. The two-thirds or so of Pakistanis with access to electricity, meanwhile, faced a shortfall of about 30 percent and power cuts 10-13 hours a day, Pakistan’s Supreme Court was reportedly told earlier this month. ¶ Pakistan's power cuts have sparked sometimes-violent protests and slowed the country's economic growth. ¶ If implemented, the proposed transmission line would serve as a sign of goodwill and perhaps earn a small profit for Indian generators. But if 500-1,000 MW of power would help ease Pakistan's power shortage, it wouldn't solve the country’s energy problems. After all, Pakistan has about 22,000 MW of generating capacity, compared to 212,000 MW for India. ¶ Nonetheless, turning to India for power is part of a larger Pakistani strategy to buy more electricity from its neighbors. It imported about 70 MW from Iran last year, is building another 100-MW link and has plans for a 1,000-MW link. There is talk of bringing in 1,000 MW from Tajikistan via Afghanistan, too. ¶ Aside from power, there is also a proposal for an India-to-Pakistan natural gas pipeline. This would allow Pakistan to import either Indian natural gas or liquefied natural gas (LNG) from a third country delivered to one of India's LNG terminals and sent through its pipeline network to Pakistan. Despite years of effort, Pakistan has failed to build its own LNG terminal. ¶ But a natural gas pipeline is the least likely to materialize of the proposed energy cooperation efforts. India only meets about half of its natural gas needs from its own production and its limited LNG import capacity. And a drop in production from Reliance Industries’ massive KG-D6 field off India's east coast means India’s ability to satisfy its own LNG needs has been getting worse, not better. ¶ Still, a delegation from Indian state-controlled gas distribution company GAIL has reportedly offered to deliver to Pakistan 400 million cubic feet of gas per day. To put that in perspective, Pakistan—which uses gas for power generation, cooking, heating and fueling vehicles, among other things—is now surviving on domestic production of about 4 billion cubic feet per day. ¶ Potential profits and international politics may overshadow the fact that Indian consumers need this natural gas, too. Private and state-owned Indian companies may be willing to short their Indian customers if they can get a better offer from across the border. And officials in New Delhi may be willing to let them do so in the name of India-Pakistan confidence-building measures. ¶ Less controversial than the power and natural gas proposals is a plan for India to build a pipeline across the border to sell gasoline or diesel to Pakistan. Although India doesn't produce much crude oil, it is a refining hub: It imports more crude than it needs and turns the excess into gasoline, diesel and other products that it exports. Indian refiners would welcome a new market. ¶ This cross-border energy trade is seen by some as a test-run for India-Pakistan cooperation on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) and Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) natural gas pipeline projects. The odds at the moment are stacked against both projects. Instability in Afghanistan makes TAPI tough, while U.S. sanctions on Iran make Indian involvement in IPI doubtful. But these factors could change in the future. ¶ More immediately, India's willingness to help ease Pakistan's energy shortage might encourage Sharif's PML-N government to follow through on its predecessor's promise to grant India most favored nation trading status. This is something Indian companies want and many Pakistani businesses don't: They fear they will be overwhelmed by competition from their massive neighbor. ¶ Nevertheless, if India and Pakistan can work together on energy and increase trade, both countries would benefit. Pakistan would get energy to fuel its lagging economy, and India would get a new market for energy and other exports. As a side benefit, integrating their economies a bit more might help to normalize relations and make future conflicts less likely.

#### Won't escalate

Tom Wright '13, reporter for the Wall Street Journal, 1/16/13, "Don't Expect Worsening of India, Pakistan Ties," Wall Street Journal, http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2013/01/16/dont-expect-worsening-of-india-pakistan-ties/

There’s no end for now to the hostile rhetoric between India and Pakistan. But that doesn’t necessarily presage anything more drastic. Pakistan claims another of its soldiers died Tuesday night in firing across the Line of Control in Kashmir, the divided Himalayan region claimed by both nations. Indian army chief, Gen. Bikram Singh, on Wednesday, said Pakistan had opened fire and India retaliated. “If any of their people have died, it would have been in retaliation to their firing,” Gen. Singh said. ”When they fire, we also fire.” It was the latest in tit-for-tat recriminations over deaths in Kashmir that began last week. Pakistan claimed one of its soldiers died on Jan. 6. Two days later, India said Pakistani forces killed two of its soldiers and mutilated the bodies. Tuesday night, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said the mutilations meant it could not be “business as usual” between the countries. That has worried some that peace talks, which have been in train for two years, could be about to break down. Mr. Singh’s comments built on a drumbeat of anger from India. Gen. Singh, Monday called the mutilations “unpardonable” and said India withheld the right to retaliate to Pakistan aggression when and where it chooses. Pakistan Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, who is in the U.S., Tuesday termed the Indian army chief’s comments as “very hostile.” There are some other worrying signs. India said Tuesday it was delaying the start of a visa-on-arrival program meant to make it easier for some Indians and Pakistanis to visit each other’s countries. The visa program, like talks on opening up bilateral trade, is supposed to pave the way toward broader peace talks that would encompass thornier issues, like how to solve the Kashmir problem. Also Tuesday, nine Pakistani hockey players who had come to participate in a tournament in India were sent home due to fears of protests and violence against them. Still, there’s little benefit for either side to escalate what is now still sporadic firing over the Line of Control, the de facto border in Kashmir. Pakistan is embroiled in its own political meltdown sparked by the Supreme Court’s decision Tuesday to order the arrest of Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf on allegations of corruption. Tens of thousands of protesters Tuesday took to the streets in Islamabad, and remain there today, demanding immediate elections and a greater role for the army and Supreme Court in politics. Pakistan’s military continues to play an important political role, dominating defense and foreign policy. But it has so far shown little sign of mounting a full-blown coup despite persistent rumors of military intervention. Pakistan’s government must hold national elections by May, meaning the next few months are likely to be choppy ones in Pakistan politics. In such an environment, the military is unlikely to want to dial up tensions with India. On the Indian side, despite Mr. Singh’s unusually strident tone Tuesday, there also will be pause before taking matters to the next level. Mr. Singh has put immense personal political capital into trying to improve ties with Pakistan since he came to power in 2004. Last year, he hosted Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari in New Delhi and promised a return visit. Such a trip is clearly off the table for now. But India still has put too much into peace talks to throw away the progress made so far on visas, trade and other issues. Even Gen. Singh, India’s army chief, Monday said he did not believe the latest flare-up would lead to a broader escalation in violence and an official end to a 2003 ceasefire agreement in Kashmir. The clashes so far, he noted, have been limited to specific areas of the Line of Control.